607SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral
agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those violations as is without
all Necessity.
620SECTION XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be
connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such
a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.
623III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians hold, be
necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dispraise, &c.
624SECTION I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praise-worthy.
627SECTION II. The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily
holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.
637SECTION III. The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man
in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with
Blameworthiness.
642SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral
Inability to obey.
653SECTION V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to
excuse in the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly
considered.
659SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but
utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or
inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral Agency.
665SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence
of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions.
671IV. Wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of Arminians, in support and
defence of the fore-mentioned notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, &c. and against
the opposite doctrine, are considered.
672SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and
acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.
681SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of
Action, and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders
of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.
690SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to
suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
695SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of
mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame,
Reward and Punishment.
vi