180 INSTITUTES OF THE [bOOK I
For when they wish to speak with the greatest simphcity.
they divide the soul into appetite and intellect, and make both
these twofold. The latter, they say, is sometimes contempla-
tive, being content merely with knowledge, and having no
tendency to action,— which Cicero thinks is designated by the
word ingenium,—and sometimes practical, variously influen-
cing the will with the apprehension of good or evil. This di-
vision comprehends the science of living in a just and virtuous
manner. The latter, that is, appetite, they divide into will and
concupiscence ; they call it " will," whenever appetite obeys
reason ; but when, shaking oif the yoke of reason, it runs into
intemperance, they give it the name of " concupiscence."
Thus they imagine that man_is__always possessed of reason
safficjeTTFTor the proper government of himselTt
*
VII. We are constrained to depart"a littleTlrom this mode of
instruction, because the philosophers, being ignorant of the cor-
ruption of nature proceeding from the punishment of the fall,
improperly confound two very difl^erent states of mankind.
Let us, therefore, submit the following division—that thehuman
, soul has tw.n ./acuities which relate to our present design, the
^r understanding and the will. Now, let it be the office of the
understan^tmg^o discriminate between objects, as they shall
respectively appear deserving of approbation or disapprobation
;
but of the will, to choose and follow what the understanding
shall have pronounced to be good ; to abhor and avoid what it
shall have condemned. Here let us not stay to discuss those
subtleties of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of itself,
but that it is moved by the choice, which he also calls the ap-
petitive intellect. Without perplexing ourselves with unneces-
sary questions, it should be sufficient for us to know that the
X understanding is, as it were, the guide and governor of the soul
;
that the wjlj.always respects its aulhority, and waits for its
judgment in its desires. For which reason Aristotle himself
truly observed, that avoidance and pursuit in the appetite, bear
a resemblance to affirmation and negation in the mind. How
certain the government of the understanding is in the direction
of the will, we shall see in another part of this work. HereX
we only intend to show that no power can be found in thej
soul, which may not properly be referred to one or the other of/
those two members. But in this manner we comprehend the
sense in the understanding, which some distinguish thus : sense,
they say, inclines to pleasure, whereas the understanding fol-
lows what is good ; that thence it happens that the appetite of
sense becomes concupiscence and lust, and the affection of the
understanding becomes will. But instead of the word "appe-
tite," which they prefer, I use the word " will^' which is more
common.