SECT. XI.
The evidence of God’s certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.
That the acts of the Wills of moral Agents are not contingent events, in such a sense, as
to be without all necessity, appears by God’s certain Foreknowledge of such events.
In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God has a certain
Foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral Agents; and secondly, show the consequence,
or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents are not contingent, so as
to be without necessity of connexion and consequence.
First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain Foreknowledge of the free
actions of moral Agents.
One would think it wholly needless to enter on such an argument with any that profess
themselves Christians: but so it is; God’s certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral
Agents, is denied by some that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God; and
especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most
High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit; -supposing myself herein to
have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible.
Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God’s prediction of such events. Here I
would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms.
1. If God does not foreknow, He cannot foretell such events; that is, He cannot peremp-
torily and certainly foretell them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concerning
events of this kind, then he can declare no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to
foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or declare positive Foreknowledge.
2. If God does not certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral Agents, then neither
can he certainly foreknow those events which are dependenton these Volitions. The existence
of the one depending on the existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the
one depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other; and the one cannot be more
certain than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive soever the consequences of the
Volitions of moral Agents may be; though they should extend to an alteration of the state
of things through the universe, and should be continued in a series of successive events to
all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of
series, each of them going on in an endless chain of events; God must be as ignorant of all
these consequences, as he is of the Volition whence they first take their rise: and the whole
state of things depending on them, how important, extensive, and vast soever, must be hid
from him.
These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the
following things.
SECTION XI. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.
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SECTION XI. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions…