CHAP. XII.] SOME KNOWLEDGE IS CERTAIN. 403
in your sleep. For who does not know that what people see
in dreams is precisely like what they see when awake ? But
he who is certain of the knowledge of his own life, does not
therein say, I know I am awake, but, I know I am alive ;
therefore, whether he be asleep or awake, he is alive. Nor can
he be deceived in that knowledge by dreams ; since it belongs
to a living man both to sleep and to see in sleep. Nor can
the Academic again say, in confutation of this knowledge.
Perhaps you are mad, and do not know it : for what madmen
see is precisely like what they also see who are sane ; but he
who is mad is alive. Nor does he answer the Academic by
saying, I know I am not mad, but, I know I am alive. There-
fore he who says he knows he is alive, can neither be deceived
nor lie. Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of
sight be presented to him who says, I know I am alive ; yet
he will fear none of them, for he who is deceived yet is alive.
But if such things alone pertain to human knowledge, they
are very few indeed ; unless that they can be so multiplied in
each kind, as not only not to be few, but to reach in the
result to infinity. Eor he who says, I know I am alive, says
that he knows one single thing. Further, if he says, I know
that I know I am alive, now there are two; but that he
knows these two is a third thing to know. And so he can
add a fourth and a fifth, and innumerable others, if he holds
out. But since he cannot either comprehend an innumerable
number by additions of units, or say a thing innumerable times,
he comprehends this at least, and with perfect certainty, viz.
that this is both true, and so innumerable that he cannot truly
comprehend and say its infinite number. This same thingmay
be noticed also in the case of a will that is certain. For itwould
be an impudent answer to make to any one who should say, I
will to be happy, that perhaps you are deceived. And if he
should say, I know that I will this, and I know that I know
it, he can add yet a third to these two, viz. that he knows
these two ; and a fourth, that he knows that he knows these
two ; and so on ad infinitum. Likewise, if any one were to
say, I will not to be mistaken ; will it not be true, whether he
is mistaken or whether he is not, that nevertheless he does
will not to be mistaken ? Would it not be most impudent to