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constructs by mere logic a blasphemy upon them. It attempts no demonstration that could
attract towards such a conception of the doctrine: it merely contains the statement of an
unproved impiety, as if it were telling us a dream. While the Church teaches that we must
not divide our faith amongst a plurality of beings, but must recognize no difference of being
in three Subjects or Persons, whereas our opponents posit a variety and unlikeness amongst
them as Beings, this writer confidently assumes as already proved what never has been, and
never can be, proved by argument: maybe he has not even yet found hearers for his talk: or
he might have been informed by one of them who was listening intelligently that every
statement which is made at random, and without proof, is ‘an old woman’s tale,’ and
powerless to prove the question, in itself, unaided by any plea whatever fetched from the
Scriptures, or from human reasonings. So much for this.
But let us still scrutinize his words. He declares each of these Beings, whom he has
shadowed forth in his exposition, to be single and absolutely one. We believe that the most
boorish and simple-minded would not deny that the Divine Nature, blessed and transcendent
as it is, was ‘single.’ That which is viewless, formless, and sizeless, cannot be conceived of
as multiform and composite. But it will be clear, upon the very slightest reflection, that this
view of the supreme Being as ‘simple,’ however finely they may talk of it, is quite inconsistent
with the system which they have elaborated. For who does not know that, to be exact, sim-
plicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of no degrees. In this case there is no mixture
or conflux of qualities to think of; we comprehend a potency without parts and composition;
how then, and on what grounds, could any one perceive there any differences of less and
more. For he who marks differences there must perforce think of an incidence of certain
qualities in the subject. He must in fact have perceived differences in largeness and smallness
therein, to have introduced this conception of quantity into the question: or he must posit
abundance or diminution in the matter of goodness, strength, wisdom, or of anything else
that can with reverence be associated with God: and neither way will he escape the idea of
composition. Nothing which possesses wisdom or power or any other good, not as an ex-
ternal gift, but rooted in its nature, can suffer diminution in it; so that if any one says that
he detects Beings greater and smaller in the Divine Nature, he is unconsciously establishing
a composite and heterogeneous Deity, and thinking of the Subject as one thing, and the
quality, to share in which constitutes as good that which was not so before, as another. If
he had been thinking of a Being really single and absolutely one, identical with goodness
rather than possessing it, he would not be able to count a greater and a less in it at all. It was
said, moreover, above that good can be diminished by the presence of evil alone, and that
where the nature is incapable of deteriorating, there is no limit conceived of to the goodness:
the unlimited, in fact, is not such owing to any relation whatever, but, considered in itself,
escapes limitation. It is, indeed, difficult to see how a reflecting mind can conceive one in-
finite to be greater or less than another infinite. So that if he acknowledges the supreme
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His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is 'single' is only verbal.