his own. There was therefore in them either a knowledge of good or an opinion of good,
which ought by no means to belong to supreme evil. In the second place, whence had they
known, that good placed outside of themselves, which they designed to injure, existed at
all. If they had intellectually perceived it, what is more excellent than such a mind? Is there
anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth except the knowledge of
that supreme and sincere good? What therefore is now scarcely conceded to a few good
and just men, was mere evil, no good assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls
bore bodies and saw the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what hearts, what in-
tellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those eyes, with which the minds of just men
can scarcely be compared? How great good things we find in supreme evil! For if to see
God is evil, God is not a good; but God is a good; therefore to see God is good; and I know
not what can be compared to this good. Since to see anything is good, whence can it be
made out that to be able to see is evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds
brought it about, that the divine essence could be seen by them, brought about a great thing
and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But if it was not brought about, but it was
such in itself and eternal, it is difficult to find anything better than this evil.
17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy things which by the
reasonings of the Manichæans they are compelled to have, I should have asked, whether
God condemns any or no souls. If none, there is no judgment of rewards and punishments,
no providence, and the world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or rather is
not administered at all. For the name administration must not be given to chances. But if
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it is impious for all those that are bound by any religion to believe this, it remains either
that there is condemnation of some souls, or that there are no sins. But if there are no sins,
neither is there any evil. Which if the Manichæans should say, they would slay their heresy
with a single blow. Therefore they and I agree that some souls are condemned by divine
law and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is that justice? If evil, are they so by
nature, or by will? But by nature souls can in no way be evil. Whence do we teach this.
From the above definitions of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil, and
that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin without will, is great craziness,
and to hold any one guilty of sin for not doing what he could not do, belongs to the height
of iniquity and insanity. Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by nature not by
will, that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind free both for doing and not doing,
if finally no power of abstaining from their work is conceded to them; we cannot hold that
the sin is theirs.214 But all confess both that evil souls are justly, and souls that have not
214 In his Retractations, Augustin explains that by nature is to be understood the state in which we were
created without vice. He transfers the entire argument from the actual condition of man to the primitive Adamic
condition. It is evident, however, that this was not his meaning when he combated the Manichæans. The
question of infant sinfulness arises here also, and is discussed in the usual Anti-Pelagian way.—A.H.N.
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From the Definitions Given of Sin and Will, He Overthrows the Entire Heresy…