Nature. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Be-
ing,—“good,” “ungenerate,” “incorruptible,”—but to each of these “is” does not fail to be
supplied. Any one, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this un-
generate Being, as He is, would speak in vain, if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated
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in Him, and were silent as to that essence which he undertakes by his words to explain. To
be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition
of “Being” is one thing, and that of “being in some particular way” is another; and this843
has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose
to us the names of the essence, and then divide the Nature by the divergence of the appella-
tions;—so long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his
scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names844 have no separate existence.
Such then is Eunomius’ stronger handle against the truth, while we pass by in silence
many views which are to be found in this part of his composition; for it seems to me right
that those who run in this armed race845 against the enemies of the truth should arm
themselves against those who are fairly fenced about with the plausibility of falsehood, and
not defile their argument with such conceptions as are already dead and of offensive odour.
His supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their essence846 must needs
exist corporeally and be joined to corruption (for this he says in this part of his work), I
shall willingly pass by like some cadaverous odour, since I think every reasonable man will
perceive how dead and corrupt such an argument is. For who knows not that the multitude
of human souls is countless, yet one essence underlies them all, and the consubstantial
substratum in them is alien from bodily corruption? so that even children can plainly see
the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they have the same essence
one with another, but because of their possessing a compound nature. The idea of the
compound nature is one, that of the common nature of their essence is another, so that it
is true to say, “corruptible bodies are of one essence,” but the converse statement is not true
at all, if it be anything like, “this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible,” as is shown
in the case of the souls which have one essence, while yet corruption does not attach to them
843 What “this” means is not clear: it may be “the Being,” but most probably is the distinction which S.
Gregory is pointing out between the Being and Its attributes, which he considers has not been sufficiently recog-
nized.
844 Reading τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ὄντων with the Paris editions. Oehler reads νοημάτων, but does not give
any authority for the change.
845 The metaphor seems slightly confused, being partly taken from a tournament, or gladiatorial contest,
partly from a race in armour.
846 The word οὐσία seems to have had in Eunomius’ mind something of the same idea of corporeal existence
attaching to it which has been made to attach to the Latin “substantia,” and to the English “substance.”
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After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and…