§18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no
demonstration that it is so.
Let us examine the following as well. He calls one Being the work of another, the second
of the first, and the third of the second. On what previous demonstration does this statement
rest: what proofs does he make use of, what method, to compel belief in the succeeding Being
as a result of the preceding? For even if it were possible to draw an analogy for this from
created things, such conjecturing about the transcendent from lower existences would not
be altogether sound, though the error in arguing from natural phenomena to the incompre-
hensible might then be pardonable. But as it is, none would venture to affirm that, while
the heavens are the work of God, the sun is that of the heavens, and the moon that of the
sun, and the stars that of the moon, and other created things that of the stars: seeing that
all are the work of One: for there is one God and Father of all, of Whom are all things. If
anything is produced by mutual transmission, such as the race of animals, not even here
does one produce another, for nature runs on through each generation. How then, when it
is impossible to affirm it of the created world, can he declare of the transcendent existencies
that the second is a work of the first, and so on? If, however, he is thinking of animal gener-
ation, and fancies that such a process is going on also amongst pure existences, so that the
older produces the younger, even so he fails to be consistent: for such productions are of
the same type as their progenitors: whereas he assigns to the members of his succession
strange and uninherited qualities: and thus displays a superfluity of falsehood, while striving
to strike truth with both hands at once, in a clever boxer’s fashion. In order to show the in-
ferior rank and diminution in intrinsic value of the Son and Holy Spirit, he declares that
“one is produced from another;” in order that those who understand about mutual generation
might entertain no idea of family relationship here: he contradicts the law of nature by de-
claring that “one is produced from another,” and at the same time exhibiting the Son as a
bastard when compared with His Father’s nature.
But one might find fault with him, I think, before coming to all this. If, that is, any one
else, previously unaccustomed to discussion and unversed in logical expression, delivered
his ideas in this chance fashion, some indulgence might be shown him for not using the re-
cognized methods for establishing his views. But considering that Eunomius has such an
abundance of this power, that he can advance by his ‘irresistible’ method112 of proof even
112 καταληπτικῆς ἐφόδου—ἡ κατάληψις. These words are taken from the Stoic logic, and refer to the Stoic
view of the standard of truth. To the question, How are true perceptions distinguished from false ones, the Stoics
answered, that a true perception is one which represents a real object as it really is. To the further question, How
may it be known that a perception faithfully represents a reality, they replied by pointing to a relative not an
absolute test—the degree of strength with which certain perceptions force themselves upon our notice. Some of
our perceptions are of such a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on them assent. Such perceptions produce
in us that strength of conviction which the Stoics call a conception. Whenever a perception forces itself upon
He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.
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He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity.…