contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that
connexion. So God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view
of the firm and indissoluble connexion of the subject and predicate of the proposition that
affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future ex-
istence, but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then
the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence
of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then, he sees a firm
connexion between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contra-
diction.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, that mere Knowledge does not affect the thing
known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing
to be already, both future and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity, supposes
futurity; and a certain Knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that
certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty
of Knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or, which is
the same thing, the Necessity of the event.
I would observe one thing further; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose,
that God’s Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event fore-
known; this is so far from showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of
the existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it
shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been;
inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual in-
fluence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience: the effect exists already;
and as the effect supposes the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the
future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having
already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more
firm and stable than its cause, ground, and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the
foundation.
To illustrate this matter; let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass,
for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance,
and out of sight) which they resemble: if it be so, then, as these images in the telescope have
had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise
than that they have existed; so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble,
this proves the existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm, and necessary,
as the existence of these effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on
the other.—Now let us suppose future existences, some way or other, to have influence back,
to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass,
a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that these images are
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…