necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the
wisest of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honourable.
The forementioned author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, &c. as has been observed,
represents that doctrine of the Divine Will being in every thing necessarily determined by
superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical
medium of fate: he insists, (p. 93, 94.) that this moral Necessity and impossibility is, in effect,
the same thing with physical and natural Necessity, and impossibility: and says, (p. 54, 55.)
“The scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the understanding, and the
understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and
virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate
and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and
present situation of persons and things; for this existence and situation necessarily makes
such an appearance to the mind; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and
judgment, concerning these things; this judgment necessarily determines the Will; and thus,
by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become nat-
ural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions.”
And yet this same author allows, (p. 30, 31.) That a perfectly wise being will constantly
and certainly choose what is most fit; and says, (p. 102, 103.) “I grant, and always have
granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent superior fitness of things, God acts ac-
cording to it, so as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings as
a Governor and Distributer of rewards and punishments.” Yea, he says expressly, (p. 42.)
“That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and goodness
in things.”
So that, according to this author, putting these several passages of his Essay together,
there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts
and exercises of God’s holiness, justice, and faithfulness; and he never does any thing which
is in itself supremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind
of mechanical medium of fate; and in what he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of
the world, he exercises no moral excellency; exercising no freedom in these things, because
he acts by moral Necessity, which is, in effect, the same with physical or natural Necessity;
and therefore, he only acts by an Hobbistical fatality; “as a Being indeed of vast understanding,
as well as power and efficiency, (as he said before,) but without a will to choose, being a kind
of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme influence. “For he allows, that in all
these things, God’s Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and
that it is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise
belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise, and excellent
course, in any one instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common
sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honour of any being, that
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SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.