sequences of what has been urged by way of objection show us Mind as something other
than the thing perceived?
That the thing perceived, I replied, is not the same as the thing not perceived, I grant;
but I do not discover any answer to our question in such a statement; it is not yet clear to
me what we are to think that thing not-perceived to be; all I have been shown by your argu-
ment is that it is not anything material; and I do not yet know the fitting name for it. I wanted
especially to know what it is, not what it is not.
We do learn, she replied, much about many things by this very same method, inasmuch
as, in the very act of saying a thing is “not so and so,” we by implication interpret the very
nature of the thing in question1766. For instance, when we say a “guileless,” we indicate a
good man; when we say “unmanly,” we have expressed that a man is a coward; and it is
possible to suggest a great many things in like fashion, wherein we either convey the idea
of goodness by the negation of badness1767, or vice versâ. Well, then, if one thinks so with
regard to the matter now before us, one will not fail to gain a proper conception of it. The
question is,—What are we to think of Mind in its very essence? Now granted that the inquirer
has had his doubts set at rest as to the existence of the thing in question, owing to the
activities which it displays to us, and only wants to know what it is, he will have adequately
discovered it by being told that it is not that which our senses perceive, neither a colour,
nor a form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a cubic dimension, nor a point,
nor anything else perceptible in matter; supposing, that is,1768 that there does exist a
something beyond all these.
Here I interrupted her discourse: If you leave all these out of the account I do not see
how you can possibly avoid cancelling along with them the very thing which you are in
search of. I cannot at present conceive to what, as apart from these, the perceptive activity
is to cling. For on all occasions in investigating with the scrutinizing intellect the contents
of the world, we must, so far as we put our hand1769 at all on what we are seeking, inevitably
1766 Remove comma after ζητουμένου, in Paris Editt.
1767 or vice versâ, i.e. the idea of badness by the negation of goodness. Krabinger appositely quotes a passage
from Plotinus: “Who could picture to himself evil as a specific thing, appearing as it does only in the absence of
each good?…it will be necessary for all who are to know what evil is to have a clear conception about good: since
even in dealing with real species the better take precedence of the worse; and evil is not even a species, but rather
a negation.” Cf. Origen, In Johan. p. 66 A, πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει. See also Gregory’s
Great Catechism, cap. v. and vii.
1768 supposing, that is. This only repeats what was said above: “granted that the inquirer has had his doubts
set at rest as to the existence of the thing.” It is the reading of Krabinger (εἰ δή τι), and the best. Sifanus follows
the less supported reading οἶδεν ὅτι, which is open to the further objection that it would be absurd to say, “when
a man learns that A is not B he knows that it is something else.” The reading of the Paris. Editt. ἴδῃ is unintelligible.
1769 (καθ᾽) ὅσον τε…θιγγάνομεν
810
On the Soul and the Resurrection.