Chapter 1.—That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different
Sects of Philosophy Might Be Formed by the Various Opinions Regarding the Supreme
Good.
As I see that I have still to discuss the fit destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the
heavenly, I must first explain, so far as the limits of this work allow me, the reasonings by
which men have attempted to make for themselves a happiness in this unhappy life, in order
that it may be evident, not only from divine authority, but also from such reasons as can be
adduced to unbelievers, how the empty dreams of the philosophers differ from the hope
which God gives to us, and from the substantial fulfillment of it which He will give us as
our blessedness. Philosophers have expressed a great variety of diverse opinions regarding
the ends of goods and of evils, and this question they have eagerly canvassed, that they might,
if possible, discover what makes a man happy. For the end of our good is that for the sake
of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for its own sake; and the end
of evil is that on account of which other things are to be shunned, while it is avoided on its
own account. Thus, by the end of good, we at present mean, not that by which good is des-
troyed, so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is finished, so that it becomes complete;
and by the end of evil we mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its
development. These two ends, therefore, are the supreme good and the supreme evil; and,
as I have said, those who have in this vain life professed the study of wisdom have been at
great pains to discover these ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme
evil in this life. And although they erred in a variety of ways, yet natural insight has prevented
them from wandering from the truth so far that they have not placed the supreme good and
evil, some in the soul, some in the body, and some in both. From this tripartite distribution
of the sects of philosophy, Marcus Varro, in his book De Philosophia,1259 has drawn so large
a variety of opinions, that, by a subtle and minute analysis of distinctions, he numbers
without difficulty as many as 288 sects,—not that these have actually existed, but sects which
are possible.
To illustrate briefly what he means, I must begin with his own introductory statement
in the above-mentioned book, that there are four things which men desire, as it were by
nature without a master, without the help of any instruction, without industry or the art of
living which is called virtue, and which is certainly learned:1260 either pleasure, which is
an agreeable stirring of the bodily sense; or repose, which excludes every bodily inconveni-
1259 Not extant.
1260 Alluding to the vexed question whether virtue could be taught.
That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects of Philosophy Might Be Formed by the Various Opinions Regarding the Supreme Good.
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That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects…