is vulgarly so called, there is a strong connexion between the thing said to be necessary, and
some thing antecedent to it, in the order of nature; so there is also a philosophical necessity.
And though in both kinds of necessity, the connexion cannot be called by that name, with
relation to an opposite will or endeavour, to which it is superior; which is the case in vulgar
necessity; yet in both, the connexion is prior to Will and endeavour, and so, in some respect,
superior. In both kinds of necessity, there is a foundation for some certainty of the proposi-
tion, that affirms the event.—The terms used being the same, and the things signified
agreeing in these and some other general circumstances; and the expressions as used by
philosophers being not well defined, and so of obscure and loose signification; hence persons
are not aware of the great difference; and the notions of innocence or faultiness, which were
so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in their minds, ever since they
can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were altogether natural and
necessary; and they that go about to make a separation, seem to them to do great violence
even to nature itself.
IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason, that men should
be blamed for that which is necessary, with a moral necessity, (which, as was observed before,
is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due consideration, men inwardly
entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be against men’s Wills and sincere en-
deavors. They go away with that notion, that men may truly will, and wish, and strive, that
it may be otherwise; but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus
concerning themselves: some wicked men think they wish that they were good, that they
love God and holiness; but yet do not find that their wishes produce the effect.—The reasons
why men think so, are as follow:
1. They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have a better Will, in the
manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a contradiction to suppose the Will to be
directly and properly against itself. And they do not consider that this indirect willingness
is entirely a different thing from properly willing what is the duty and virtue required; and
that there is no virtue in that sort of willingness which they have. They do not consider, that
the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the Will at all
against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some disagreeable consequences. But the
making of the requisite distinction requires more care of reflection and thought, than most
men are used to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to think
well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though
their respect to virtue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous
that truly excites or terminates their inclinations.
2. Another thing that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a supposition that this
moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be, against men’s Wills and true endeavors, is
the derivation of the terms often used to express it. Such words for instance, as unable, un-
693
SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to…