CHAP. IV.
Of self-love, and its various influence, to cause love to others, or the contrary.
Many assert, that all love arises from self-love. In order to determine this point, it should
be clearly determined what is meant by self-love. Self-love, I think, is generally defined “a
man’s love of his own happiness;” which is short, and may be thought very plain: but in
reality is an ambiguous definition, as the expression his own, is equivocal, and liable to be
taken in two very different senses. For a man’s own happinessmay either be taken universally,
for all the happiness or pleasure of which the mind is in any regard the subject, or whatever
is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man takes in his own
proper, private, and separate good. And so self-love may be taken two ways.
1. It may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is pleasing to him. Which comes
only to this, that self-love is a man’s liking, and being suited and pleased in that which he
likes, and which pleases him; or, that it is a man’s loving what he loves. For whatever a man
loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happiness,
or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder they
suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever
a man loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he loves.—If by self-love is meant
nothing else but a man’s loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being averse to what
is disagreeable, this is calling that self-love, which is only a general capacity of loving or
hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased; which is the same thing as a man’s
having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or
disagreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable
of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chooses, is grateful to
him, whatever that be; whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbors, or the
glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure,
good, or happiness.
But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety and absurdity even in
the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of
our love, does not arise from self-love? For that would be the same as to inquire, Whether
the reason why our love is fixed on such and such particular objects, is not, that we have a
capacity of loving some things? This may be a general reason why men love or hate any
thing at all; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing, and hate nothing.
But it can never be a reason why men’s love is placed on such and such objects. That a man
in general loves, and is pleased with happiness, or has a capacity of enjoying happiness,
cannot be the reason why such and such things become his happiness: as for instance, why
the good of his neighbour, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to
him, and so becomes a part of his happiness.
CHAPTER IV. Of self-love and its influence.
887
CHAPTER IV. Of self-love and its influence.