us, it would not be difficult to bring round these scattered notions of a plurality of Gods to
the acknowledgment of a unity of Deity. For if he admits that perfection is in every respect
to be ascribed to the subject before us, though there is a plurality of these perfect things
which are marked with the same character, he must be required by a logical necessity, either
to point out the particularity in each of these things which present no distinctive variation,
but are found always with the same marks, or, if (he cannot do that, and) the mind can grasp
nothing in them in the way of particular, to give up the idea of any distinction. For if neither
as regards “more and less” a person can detect a difference (in as much as the idea of perfec-
tion does not admit of it), nor as regards “worse” and “better” (for he cannot entertain a
notion of Deity at all where the term “worse” is not got rid of), nor as regards “ancient” and
“modern” (for what exists not for ever is foreign to the notion of Deity), but on the contrary
the idea of Godhead is one and the same, no peculiarity being on any ground of reason to
be discovered in any one point, it is an absolute necessity that the mistaken fancy of a plur-
ality of Gods would be forced to the acknowledgment of a unity of Deity. For if goodness,
and justice, and wisdom, and power may be equally predicated of it, then also imperishability
and eternal existence, and every orthodox idea would be in the same way admitted. As then
all distinctive difference in any aspect whatever has been gradually removed, it necessarily
follows that together with it a plurality of Gods has been removed from his belief, the gen-
eral identity bringing round conviction to the Unity.
878
Prologue.