(ὁμοούσιον) with another, not with itself. Rightly, then, do we call the Son “ὁμοούσιος” (of
the same substance), with the Father, forasmuch as that term expresses both the distinction
of Persons and the unity of nature.
127. Can they deny that the term “οὐσία” is met with in Scripture, when the Lord has
spoken of bread, that is, “ἐπιούσιος,”1534 and Moses has written “ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι λαὸς
περιούσιος ”?1535 What does “οὐσία” mean, whence comes the name, but from “οὖσα
ἀεί,”1536 “that which endures for ever? For He Who is, and is for ever, is God; and therefore
the Divine Substance, abiding everlastingly, is called οὐσία. Bread is ἐπιούσιος, because,
taking the substance of abiding power from the substance of the Word, it supplies this to
heart and soul, for it is written: “And bread strengtheneth man’s heart.”1537
both, so to speak, had a share, by virtue of participation in which they existed and were what they were—a theory
which adapted the Platonic doctrine of Universal Ideas to expound the mysteries of the Godhead. It was the
perverse use of the term by such persons as Paul of Samosata (condemned by the Synod of Antioch, 269 a.d.)
that caused it to be received at first with suspicion even by the orthodox at the Nicene Synod in 325 a.d. The
true doctrine would be to this effect, that in relation to the Persons, the Godhead is not a separate, more com-
prehensive entity, existing independently, and the fount of existence to each and all of the Persons—not as the
Platonic αὐτάνθρωπος (ideal or archetypal man), for example, to the πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι (sundry individuals),
but is in each of the Persons fully and completely, yet without destruction of its unity. The Godhead is a πρώτη
οὐσία, a single, individual substance. So also is each One of the Three Persons—but their inter-relation is such
that neither is the Godhead anything apart from them, nor they anything apart from the Godhead or from each
other. It is the Three together that constitute the One Οὐσία or Essence, it is the definition of this Essence that
applies to Each of them equally, without difference, whilst Each Person retains His Personal characteristics and
Personal (not natural or substantial) “differentia.” Speaking logically, the Three Persons are “of one definition;”
speaking metaphysically, they are “of one Essence.” Now both “of one definition” and “of one essence” may be
rendered by ὁμοούσιοι.
1534 S. Matt. vi. 11. ἐπιούσιος="required for our subsistence, proper for our sustenance.” See Alford in loc.
1535 Ex. xix. 6.
1536 The derivation is philologically incorrect, for οὐσία is formed upon the fem. of the pres. part. of εἶναι,
but for all that it embodies a certain truth, inasmuch as οὐσία in its abstract use denotes simple existence, without
reference to conditions.
1537 Ps. civ. 15. The term ἐπιούσιος has a spiritual import, inasmuch as the life of the body, supported by
bread, is not all but should be subordinate to the spiritual life—the healthy body to be the instrument and vehicle
of the healthy soul, for man’s real life (though he is not apt to think it such) is not dependent on bread alone—his
whole existence is not material, though one side of it is. St. Ambrose, however, seems rather disposed to overlook
the physical material bread (which we are certainly taught to pray for) for the sake of the supra-sensible Bread
of Heaven and Food of Angels.
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Chapter XV. The Arians, inasmuch as they assert the Son to be “of another…