voluntarily: and if so, he is surely no more to blame, than if it were not from himself at all.
It is vanity to pretend, it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but metaphys-
ical refinement and subtilty, and so attended with obscurity and uncertainty.
If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blameworthy in a man must be from
himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be from something bud in himself, a bad choice,
or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil
in itself, and the man blameworthy for it, on its own account, without taking into our notion
of its blameworthiness, another bad choice, or disposition going before this, from whence
this arises: for that is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction,
which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and never comes into
the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was demon-
strated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in
the cause of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing being from a man, or from something
antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of blameworthiness: but
it is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be flam us, and not
from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our
natural sense. When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it is from his Will or choice,
he is to blame for it, because his Will is in it: so far as the Will is in it, blame is in it, and no
further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether the bad
Will be from a bad Will: there is no consideration of the original of that bad Will; because,
according to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore a thing
being from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill desert. Because
those things, in our external actions, are most properly said to be from us, which are from
our choice; and no other external actions, but those that are from us in this sense, have the
nature of blame; and they indeed, not so properly because they are from us, as because we
are in them, i. e. our Wills are in them; not so much because they are from some property
of ours, as because they are our properties.
However, all these external actions being truly from us as their cause; and we being so
used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men’s actions and
conduct which we see, and which affect human society, as deserving ill or well, as worthy
of blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all
their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about
these overt acts of men; to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful
confusion. And, therefore, I observe,
III. It is so far from being true, (whatever may be pretended,) that the proof of the doc-
trine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical
terms and notions; and that the Arminian scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness
for its defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common sense; that the very reverse is
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SECTION XIII. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which…