and immediately required by Command; and other things only indirectly, as connected
with the Will. If therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has done his duty;
and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not criminally
owing to him.
3. Both these kinds of natural Inability, and all Inability that excuses, may be resolved
into one thing; namely, want of natural capacity or strength; either capacity of understanding,
or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no
obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.
Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability may properly be the matter of
Precept or Command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invit-
ations come very much to the same thing; the difference is only circumstantial: Commands
are as much a manifestation of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much
testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that
touches the affair in hand. The main difference between Command and invitation consists
in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindness,
the goodness from which his Will arises: in the former it is his authority. But whatever be
the ground of Will in him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither
his Will, nor his expectation, is any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore,
a person being directed by invitation, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that dir-
ects—in manifesting either a Will or expectation which he has not—than a person being
known to be morally unable to do what he is directed by command is an evidence of insin-
cerity. So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to
exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from the sincerity of God’s counsels
and invitations, must be without force. 134
134 On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions, commands, counsels, invitations, and the like,
in cases where God foreknows that the event will not take place by the compliance of the moral agent addressed,
we may remark a few particulars in addition to our author’s reasoning: 1. The sincerity of prohibitions and
commands, counsels and invitations, and the like, is foundeth—not in the event of things as good or bad, or the
knowledge of events, or the purpose that secures some, or the necessity of consequence from which others flow,
nor in the moral ability of the agent, but—in the very nature and tendency of the things themselves which are
prohibited, commanded, or proposed, as good or evil, either intrinsically, if of a moral nature, or else relatively,
if of positive appointment. Therefore, 2. Whether the event be compliance or non-compliance, the command,
or invitation, &c. is perfectly sincere. For, in truth, these are neither more nor less than testimonies respecting
the goodness or badness of the things in question, in the sense before mentioned, and the consequent obligations
of the agent respecting them, under a forfeiture either declared or implied. Consequently, 3. Insincerity can attach
to a command only on supposition that the goodness or badness of the event were the ground of the signified
will, while at the same time another event, diverse from that which actually takes place, was purposed by the
same will. But, 4. Strictly speaking, no events, as such, are the objects of purpose; but rather, the purpose respects
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…