262 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
understood by the mind ; and we ourselves, i.e. our minds, are
not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible things, since
we are life. And yet, as I said, we are so familiarly occupied
with bodies, and our thought has projected itself outwardly
with so wonderful a proclivity towards bodies, that, when it
has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of things corporeal,
that it may be fixed with a much more certain and stable
knowledge in that which is spirit, it flies back to those bodies,
and seeks rest there whence it has drawn weakness. And to
this its feebleness we must suit our argument ; so that, if w^e
w^ould endeavour at any time to distinguish more aptly, and
intimate more readily, the inward spiritual thing, we must
take examples of likenesses from outward things pertaining to
the body. The outer man, then, endued as he is with the
bodily sense, is conversant with bodies. And this bodily
sense, as is easily observed, is fivefold ; seeing, hearing, smell-
ing, tasting, touching. But it is both a good deal of trouble,
and is not necessary, that we should inquire of all these five
senses about that which we seek. Tor that which one of
them declares to us, holds also good in the rest. Let us use,
then, principally the testimony of the eyes. For this bodily
sense far surpasses the rest ; and in proportion to its difference
of kind, is nearer to the sight of the mind.
Chap. ii.—A certain trinity in the sight. That there arethree things in sight,
zvhich differ in their own nature. In ivhat manner from a visible thing
vision isproduced, or the image of that thing which is seen. The matter is
^hown more clearly by an example. How these three combine in one.
2. When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three
things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and dis-
tinguished : First, the object itself which we see ; whether a
stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the
eyes ; and this certainly might exist also already before it was
seen ; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist
before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the
sense ; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the
eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention
of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evi-
dent distinction, but also a diverse nature. For, first, that
visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the