To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connexion of the event
with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the
same thing as to affirm, that there is no necessary connexion between a proposition being
infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable,
that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in
other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible
but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms
its future coming to pass, may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not
impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposition, which is now infallibly
known to be true.
II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and
without all Necessity, may be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known
to any intellect without evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because
for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that under-
standing: and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing, as for that
understanding to see evidence of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see
evidence where there is none; for that is the same thing, as to see that to be which is not.
And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is abso-
lutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.
But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all Necessity,
the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of
it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence or proof; an evident thing must be
either evident in itself; or evident in something else: that is, evident by connexion with
something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all Necessity, can have neither
of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known, by
what is now to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence, or the Necessity of its nature:
but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no
present existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent
for the future: so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there
any proof, or evidence in any thing else, or evidence of connexion with something else that
is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing
existent, with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such a
connexion destroys its contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that
there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that
event, which is contingent, without all Necessity, (if any such event there be,) neither self-
evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen
to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…