SECT. V.
Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they
are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how, this being
the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
What was last observed in the preceding section, may show—not only that the active
nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the Will is, or why it is in this manner
rather than another, but also—that if it could be proved, that volitions are contingent events,
their being and manner of being not fixed or determined by any cause, or any thing ante-
cedent; it would not at all serve the purpose of Arminians, to establish their notion of freedom,
as consisting in the Will’s determination of itself, which supposes every free act of the Will
to be determined by some act of the Will going before; inasmuch as for the Will to determine
a thing, is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by willing; and there is no way that
the Will can determine an act of the Will, than by willing that act of the Will, or, which is
the same thing, choosing it. So that here must be two acts of the Will in the case, one going
before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter the object of the former, and
chosen by the former. If the Will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does
not cause or determine it at all; for that which is not determined by choice, is not determined
voluntarily or willingly: and to say, that the Will determines something which the soul does
not determine willingly, is as much as to say, that something is done by the Will, which the
soul doth not with its Will.
So that if Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in the Will determining its own acts, be
maintained, the old absurdity and contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of
Will is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of Will. Which doth not consist with
the free acts arising without any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by any
thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving this sort of
liberty, but directly destroying it.
And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its own acts of W ill some other
way, than by a foregoing act of Will; still it will help not their cause If it determines them
by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then the Will does not determine itself;
and so the self—determiningpower of the Will is given up. And what liberty is there exercised,
according to their own opinion of liberty, by the soul being determined by something besides
its own choice? The acts of the Will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually determined
and fixed; but it is not done by the soul’s own Will and pleasure: there is no exercise at all
of choice or Will in producing the effect: and if Will and choice are not exercised in it, how
is the liberty of the Will exercised in it?
So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their notion of liberty, consisting
in the Will determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act
of Will to be determined by the soul’s own free choice, or foregoing free act of Will; foregoing,
SECTION V. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
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SECTION V. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should…