imate, unintelligent part, is made for the rational, as much as a house is prepared for the
inhabitant. And it is evident also from reason and the word of God, that it is for the sake of
some moral good in them, that moral agents are made, and the world made for them. But
it is further evident, that whatsoever is the last end of that part of creation, which is the end
of all the rest, and for which all the rest of the world was made, must be the last end of the
whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, in order to move
that aright, then it will follow, that the last end of the hand is the last end of the whole ma-
chine.
Position 5. That which appears from the Scripture to be God’s ultimate end in the chief
works of his providence, we may well determine is God’s last end in creating the world. For,
as observed, we may justly infer the end of a thing from the use of it. We must justly infer
the end of a clock, a chariot, a ship, or water-engine, from the main use to which it is applied.
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But God’s providence is his use of the world he has made. And if there be any works of
providence which are evidently God’s main works, herein appears and consists the main
use that God makes of the creation.—From these two last positions we may infer the next,
viz.
Position 6. Whatever appears, by the Scriptures, to be God’s ultimate end in his main
works of Providence towards the moral world, that we may justly infer to be the last end of
the creation of the world. Because, as was just now observed, the moral world is the chief
part of the creation, and the end of the rest; and God’s last end in creating that part of the
world, must be his last end in the creation of the whole. And it appears, by the last position,
that the end of God’s main works of Providence towards moral beings, or the main use to
which he puts them, shews the last end for which he has made them; and consequently the
main end for which he has made the whole world.
Position 7. That which divine revelation shows to be God’s ultimate end with respect
to that part of the moral world which are good, in their being and in their being good, this
we must suppose to be the end of God’s creating the world. For it has been already shown,
that God’s last end in the moral part of creation must be the end of the whole. But his end
in that part of the moral world that are good, must be the last end for which he has made
the moral world in general. For therein consists the goodness of a thing, its fitness to answer
its end; at least this must be goodness in the eyes of its author. For goodness in his eyes, is
its agreeableness to his mind. But an agreeableness to his mind, in what he makes for some
end or use, must be an agreeableness or fitness to that end. For his end in this case is his
mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with respect to that
thing. And therefore, they are good moral agents who are fitted for the end for which God
has made moral agents. And consequently, that which is the chief end to which good created
moral agents, in being good, are fitted, this is the chief end of the moral part of the creation;
and consequently of the creation in general.
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SECTION II. Concerning a just method of arguing.