ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
this work is extremely unsatisfactory. But as an exposition of
Ferrier's own views on fundamental problems, its penetrating
vigour, its incomparable lucidity, and its sustained eloquence,
make it most delightful and instructive reading. As compared
with the Institutes of Metaphysic, this book has the great
advantage that in it Ferrier is not fettered by the attempt to
follow a strictly deductive method in which succeeding
propositions are supposed to follow preceding by a rigorous"
necessity of thought." In the Lectures he deals freely and
naturally with the various problems that suggest themselves
in connexion with the course of historical development. As
a good example of these discussions I may single out what
is said on the distinction and connexion of thought and
feeling in the lectures on Socrates and Plato. It is plain
throughout that what Ferrier is primarily concerned with is
not the special teaching of Socrates or Plato, but rather the
problem itself as it took shape in his own mind. But his
treatment of the question, taken on its own merits, though
it is not adequate, is wonderfully lucid, penetrating, and
comprehensive. Thought and feeling are shown to be at
once radically distinct and inseparably united in all knowledge,
just as the universal and particular are radically distinct and
inseparably united in all reality. There is no attempt to
derive either from the other, or to subordinate either to
the other. It is as clear to Ferrier as it was to Kant that
thought without sense is empty, and that sense without thought
is blind. On the other hand, while insisting that thought is
always sensuously conditioned, his doctrine has nothing in
common with the Kantian view of sensuously presented object
as constituting a sort of screen between the mind and things as
they are in themselves. For him thought as conditioned by
feeling is an immediate relation of the mind to reality. In
all these points I find myself in principle in close agreement
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