we call indestructible. As, then, that which has no end of life is indestructible, so that which
has no beginning we call ungenerate, representing things so by the faculty of conception.”
I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these
matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and “teacher of sowing,” and
“illogical censure,” and whatever other aspersions he ventures on with his foul tongue. Let
us rather turn to the point which he tries to establish by his calumnious accusation. He
promises to convict us of saying that God is not by His nature indestructible. But we hold
only such things foreign to His nature as may be added to or subtracted from it. But, in the
case of things without which the subject is incapable of being conceived by the mind, how
can any one be open to the charge of separating His nature from itself? If, then, the indes-
tructibility which we ascribe to God were adventitious, and did not always belong to Him,
or might cease to belong to Him, he might be justified in his calumnious attack. But if it is
always the same, and our contention is, that God is always what He is, and that He receives
nothing by way of increase or addition of properties, but continues always in whatsoever is
conceived and called good, why should we be slanderously accused of not ascribing indes-
tructibility to Him as of His essential nature? But he pretends that he grounds his accusation
on the words of Basil which I have already quoted, as though we bestowed indestructibility
on God by reference to the ages. Now if our statement were put forward by ourselves, our
defence might perhaps seem open to suspicion, as if we now wanted to amend or justify any
questionable expressions of ours. But since our statements are taken from the lips of an ad-
versary, what stronger demonstration could we have of their truth than the evidence of our
opponents themselves? How is it, then, with the statement which Eunomius lays hold of
with a view to our prejudice? When, he says, we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet
to be, we speak of the infinite, and illimitable, and unending, as indestructible. Does Euno-
mius count such ascription as identical with bestowing? Yet who is such a stranger to existing
usage as to be ignorant of the proper meaning of these expressions? For that man bestows
who possesses something which another has not, while that man ascribes who designates
with a name what another has. How is it, then, that our instructor in truth is not ashamed
of his plainly calumnious impeachment? But as those who, from some disease, are bereft of
sight, are unseemly in their behaviour before the eyes of the seeing, supposing that what is
not seen by themselves is a thing unobserved also by those whose sight is unimpaired, just
such is the case of our sharp-sighted and quick-witted opponent, who supposes his hearers
to be afflicted with the same blindness to the truth as himself. And who is so foolish as not
to compare the words which he calumniously assails with his charge itself, and by reading
them side by side to detect the malice of the writer? Our statement ascribes indestructibility;
he charges it with bestowing indestructibility. What has this to do with our statement? Every
555
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.