other; either in God, angels, or men. No propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous
or vicious, as has been shown; because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom
of the Will, the foundation of all moral Agency, and exclude all capacity of either Virtue or
Vice.—-And if habits and dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can
the exercise of these dispositions be so: for the exercise of bias is not the exercise of free self-
determining Will, and so there is no exercise of Liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtuous
or vicious, either in being well or ill disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad disposition.
And whether this bias or disposition be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the
act of Will which is the effect of it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or
if there be no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the
act, then it is not choice that determines it: it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the
man, arising from nothing in him; and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of his;
and, therefore, cannot make him either the better or worse; any more than a tree is better
than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lighted upon by a nightingale; or a rock
more vicious than other rocks, because rattle-snakes have happened oftener to crawl over
it. So, that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad dispositions, either fixed or transient;
nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous inclination; nor yet any
Virtue or Vice in acting wholly without any previous inclination. Where then Shall we find
room for virtue or vice?
664
SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue,…