“incurable absurdity,” and our “simulated and culpable caution,” amounts to. But he goes
on to say that we do not know what to do in our present position, and that to cover our
perplexity we take to abusing him for his worldly learning, while we ourselves claim a
monopoly of the teaching of the Holy Spirit. Here is his other dream, namely, that he has
got so much of the heathen learning, that he appears by means of it a formidable antagonist
to Basil. Just so there have been some men who have imagined themselves enthroned with
basilicals, and of an exalted rank, because the deluded vision of their dreams, born of their
waking longings, puts such fancies into their hearts. He says that Basil, not knowing what
to do after what has been said, abuses him for his worldly learning. He would indeed have
set a high value on such abuse, that is, on being thought formidable because of the abundance
of his words even by any ordinary hearer, not to mention by Basil, and by men like him (if
any are entirely like him, or ever have been). But, as for his intervening argument, if such
low scurrility, and such tasteless buffoonery, can be called argument, by which he thinks he
impugns our cause, I pass it all over, for I deem it an abominable and ungracious thing to
soil our treatise with such pollutions; and I loathe them as men loathe some swollen and
noisome ulcer, or turn from the spectacle presented by those whose skin is bloated by excess
of humours, and disfigured with tuberous warts. And for a while our argument shall be al-
lowed to expand itself freely, without having to turn to defend itself against men who are
ready to scoff at and to tear to pieces everything that is said.
Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some
movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed as
far as it is possible to the knowledge and the contemplation of some reality. But then the
whole world of realities is divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible.
With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account of the perception of them being
so near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no
doubt about the subject before them. The differences in colour, and the differences in all
the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of hearing, or smell, or touch,
or taste, can be known and named by all possessing our common humanity; and so it is with
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all the other things which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension, the things, that
is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in the
contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of
the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the object of our search;
and then, according to the idea arising in each of us about it, we announce the result as best
we can, striving to get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about
through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often possible to have achieved
the task in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets
the notion with the appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or
in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or the interpreting capacity
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.