§3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which
is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-existent, as the Scindapsus,
Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops, Scylla, which never were generated at all, and shows that things
which are essentially different, are mutually destructive, as fire of water, and the rest in their
several relations. But in the case of the Father and the Son, as the essence is common, and the
properties reciprocally interchangeable, no injury results to the Nature.
Since, however, after the passage cited above, he professes that he will allege something
stronger still, let us examine this also, as well as the passage cited, lest we should seem to be
withdrawing our opposition in face of an overwhelming force. “If, however,” he says, “I am
to abandon all these positions, and fall back upon my stronger argument, I would say this,
that even if all the terms that he advances by way of refutation were established, our statement
will none the less be manifestly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of
the names which are significant of properties marks the divergence of the things, it is surely
necessary to allow that with the divergence of the names significant of essence is also marked
the divergence of the essences. And this would be found to hold good in all cases, I mean
in the case of essences, energies, colours, figures, and other qualities. For we denote by di-
vergent appellations the different essences, fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white
and black, triangle and circle. Why need we mention the intelligible essences, in enumerating
which the Apostle marks, by difference of names, the divergence of essence?”
Who would not be dismayed at this irresistible power of attack? The argument transcends
the promise, the experience is more terrible than the threat. “I will come,” he says, “to my
stronger argument.” What is it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those
names which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he says, allow that differences
of essence are also expressed by divergence of names. What then are these appellations of
essences by which we learn the divergence of Nature between the Father and the son? He
talks of fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His
illustrations have won him the day: his argument carries all before it: I cannot contradict
the statement that those names which are entirely incommunicable indicate difference of
natures. But our man of keen and quick-sighted intellect has just missed seeing these
points:—that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that “just,” and “incorrupt-
ible,” and all those names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the Father
and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of appellations indicates difference of
natures, the community of names will surely show the common character of the essence.
And if we must agree that the Divine essence is to be expressed by names834, it would behove
us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of
“generate” and “ungenerate,” because “good” and “incorruptible,” “just” and “wise,” and
834 On this point, besides what follows here, see the treatise against Tritheism addressed to Ablabius.
Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-existent, as the Scindapsus, Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops, Scylla, which never were generated at all, and shows that things which are essentially different, are mutually destructive, as fire of water, and the rest in their several relations. But in the case of the Father and the Son, as the essence is common, and the properties reciprocally interchangeable, no injury results to the Nature.
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Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking,…