Christ, considered with all those glorious consequences, which were within the view of the
Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious
event; and consequently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be secret, i. e. not
revealed in God’s law. And thus considered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good.
If the secret exercises of God’s Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his re-
vealed Will, respecting the same, or like objects; if the objects of both were good, or both
evil; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, respecting
these objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different
and opposite exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to
another, is so far from supposing God’s Will to be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be
supposed consistent with itself any other way. For any being to have a Will of choice respect-
ing good, and, at the same time, a Will of rejection and refusal respecting evil, is to be very
consistent: but the contrary, viz. to have the same Will towards these contrary objects, and
to choose and love both good and evil, at the same time, is to be very inconsistent.
There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and
considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it should come to pass, considering
all consequences. I believe, there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to
say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent
of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such
a thing as moral evil in the world. 151 And, if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely
151 Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that nobody who is
acquainted with him, will suspect to be very favourable to Calvinism. “It is difficult, says he, to handle the necessity
of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an
uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find, that consistently with
the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system, evils must have
place.”—Turnbull’s Principles of Moral Philosophy, p. 327, 328. He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be
seen. Again the same author, in his second vol. entitled, Christian Philosophy, (p. 35.) has these words: “If the
Author and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath
chosen the best: and. consequently, there a no absolute evil in the universe.—This being the case, all the seeming
imperfections or evils in it are such only in a partial view; and. with respect to the whole system, they are goods.
Ibid. 37. “Whence then comes evil, is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in
philosophy. And, indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense, we diametrically
contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the system, that it not good with
respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil: or, at best, very imperfect: and an author must be as
his workmanship is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at hand; That there is
no evil in the universe. What! Are there no pains, no imperfections? Is there no misery, no vice in the world?
or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are; that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are
equally hurtful, and abominable: but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole?” Ibid. p. 42.
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…