Section X.
Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular
observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings
about the Freedom of the Will.
That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been
already proved) has a necessary connexion with its cause, and so is necessary by
a necessity of connexion and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of
the Will whatsoever is excited by some motive: which is manifest, because, if the
mind, in willing after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement,
then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims
at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after
any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing, Which brings
the matter to a contradiction; because for the mind to will something, and for it
to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.
But if every act of the Will is excited
by a motive, then that Motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the Will are
excited by motives, then Motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which
is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the
acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing, as
Motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their
influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something
that is brought to pass by the influence of something else.
And if volitions are properly the effects
of their Motives, then they are necessarily connected with their Motives. Every
effect and event being as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which
is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition
is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the will: the volition,
which is caused by previous motive and inducement, is not caused by the will exercising
a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause, and excite volitions in itself.
This is not consistent with the will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium,
to determine itself to a preference; for the way in which Motives operate, is by
biasing the will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way.
Here it may be proper to observe, that
Mr. Chubb in his Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects, has advanced a scheme
of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of
itself: and that many ways.
1. He is abundant in asserting, that the
Will, in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and excitement; and that this is
the previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in
any instance. He says, (p. 262.) “No action can take place without some Motive to
excite it.” And, (p. 263,) “Volition cannot take place without SOME PREVIOUS reason
or motive to induce it.” And, (p. 310.) "Action would not take place without some
reason or motive to induce it; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty
would be exerted without some PREVIOUS reason to dispose the mind to action.” (So
also p. 257.) And he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely certain
of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have of certainty respecting
God’s moral perfections. (p. 252 – 255, 261 – 264.)
And yet, at the same time, by his scheme,
the influence of Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground
of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly
insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject of those
volitions, which motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will
comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not; and when various
Motives are presented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject.
(p. 256.) “Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting, agreeably with,
or contrary to, any Motive that presents.” (p. 257.) “Every man is at liberty to
act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these
motives, considered singly, would excite him to.— Man has power, and is as much
at liberty, to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty,
to reject those Motives that do not.” (And so p. 310, 311.) “In order to constitute
a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain
from acting, upon such moral motives, as he pleases.” And to the like purpose in
many other places. According to these things, the Will acts first, and chooses or
refuses to comply with the Motive that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing
influence: and it is first determined by the mind’s pleasure or choice, what Motives
it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.
Now, how can these things hang together?
How can the mind First act, and by its act of volition and choice determine what
motives shall be the ground and reason of its volition and choice? For this supposes,
the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect; and that the volition
is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground
of the volition; and make the prevailing of the Motive, the consequence of the volition,
of which yet it is the ground. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a motive,
and to yield to its excitement, the excitement comes in too late, and is needless
afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to
a thing, that implies, and in fact is, a choosing of the thing incited to; and the
very act of choice is before the influence of the motive which induces, and is the
ground of the choice; the son is beforehand with the father that begets him: the
choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very
influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. And so vice versa,
the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Motive, which
influence of the Motive is the consequence of that very choice.
And besides, if the Will acts first towards
the motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive
upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence of its act
and choice, then how is the Motive “a PREVIOUS ground and reason of the act and
choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place without
some PREVIOUS reason and Motive to induce it;” and that this act is consequent upon,
and follows the Motive? Which things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and
undoubted truth. So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both
before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing!
II. Agreeable to the aforementioned inconsistent
notion of the Will first acting towards the motive, choosing whether it will comply
with it, in order to it becoming a ground of the Will’s acting, before any act of
volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the
action of the will, “the passive ground or reason of that action.” Which is a remarkable
phrase; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct
and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When
he represents the Motive volition as passive, he must mean — passive in that affair,
or passive with respect to that action, which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing
to the design of his argument: he must mean, (if that can be called a meaning,)
that the Motive to volition is first acted upon or towards by the volition, choosing
to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence
from thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence.
Which is the same absurdity, as if one should say, that the soul of man, previous
to its existence, chose by what cause it would come into existence, and acted upon
its cause, to fetch influence thence, to bring it into being; and so its cause was
a passive ground of its existence!
Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes motive
or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the
ground or reason of the EXERTION of an act of the will, (p. 391, and 392.) and expressly
says, that “volition cannot TAKE PLACE without some previous ground or Motive to
induce it,” (p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as “FROM the motive, and FROM THE
INFLUENCE of the motive,” (p. 352.) “and from the influence that the Motive has
on the man, for the PRODUCTION of an action,” (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need
of multiplying words about this; it is easily judged, whether motive can be the
ground of volition taking place, so that the very production of it is from the influence
of the motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition,
is passive, or acted upon the volition. But this I will say, that a man, who insists
so much on clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion
and inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this
phrase of “passive ground of action,” so as to show it not to be confused and inconsistent.
If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb,
when he speaks of motive as a “passive ground of action,” does not mean passive
with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but some other antecedent
volition, (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means
allow of such a supposition,) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For,
(1.) If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation
of a Motive to another volition; both these supposed volitions are in effect the
very same. A volition to yield to the force of a motive inviting to choose something,
comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing which the motive invites to,
as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction
of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive, not with respect to the same volition
to which the motive excites, but to one truly distinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb,
that prior volition cannot take place without a Motive or excitement, as a previous
ground of its existence. For he insists, that “it is absurd to suppose any volition
should take place without some previous motive to induce it,” So that at last it
comes to just the same absurdity: for if every volition must have a previous motive,
then the very first in the whole series must be excited by a previous Motive; and
yet the Motive to that first volition is passive; but cannot be passive with regard
to another antecedent volition, because, by the supposition, it is the very first:
therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard
to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above,
that every volition has some motive, and that “in the nature of the thing, no volition
can take place without some motive to induce it;” yet he asserts, that volition
does not always follow the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is not governed
by any superior strength of the motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary,
previous to the volition itself. His own words (p. 258.) are as follow:
“Though with regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails,
yet it is otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger,
sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this difference is evident, namely,
that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely
passive reasons of or excitements to the action, or to the refraining from acting:
which excitements we have power, or are at liberty, to comply with or reject, as
I have showed above.” And so throughout the paragraph, he in a variety of phrases
insists, that the Will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unless
by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not
in the Motive, but in the Will; but that the will is not always determined by the
Motive which is strongest, by any strength previous to the volition itself. And
he elsewhere abundantly asserts, that the will is determined by no superior strength
or advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things, or any
circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determination of the will. And
indeed his whole discourse on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded
upon it.
But these things cannot stand together.
There is a diversity of strength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice itself.
Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite, and
dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have something in themselves
that is inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose to volition previous to volition
itself. And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they
have it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity; and some have
it in greater degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency,
considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the
strongest Motives, and those that have least, are the weakest Motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not follow
the motive which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or advantage, all things
considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which, as it
stands previously in the mind’s view, has least tendency to induce it; herein the
will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason to dispose
the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the
will must proceed without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring
the weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in
the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the same time to suppose,
that there is nothing in the motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstance of
it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any
preference: but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with
it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it that is inviting and moving,
and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as much as
to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive for the act of preference,
and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the
two rival Motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference,
it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other: and yet Mr. Chubb
supposes, that the act of preference is from previous ground and reason, in the
motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be previous
ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in
it to that event? If one thing follows another, without any previous tendency to
its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any
manner of previous reason why it should follow.
Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes,
that the event follows an antecedent, as the ground of its existence, which has
not only no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference,
which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous
view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival
motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness,
or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the
contrary Motive; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency
to comparative neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: and
yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground or reason of
this act of preference, exciting it, and disposing the mind to it. Which I leave
the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd
to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground
and reason why that consequent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency
to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason why
that event does follow.
An act of choice or preference is a comparative
act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared,
and stand in competition in the mind’s view. If the mind, in this comparative act,
prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts
absolutely without motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if
a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, to both which he finds an appetite,
but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances
or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the
other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses
that which he has least appetite to, and refuse that to which he has the strongest
appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive, Excitement,
Reason, or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either;
because his volition in this case is a comparative act, following a comparative
view of the food, which he chooses, in which view his preference has absolutely
no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and motive. And if there
be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner,
from the same principle volition may arise wholly without motive on either side.
If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive:
for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the
limits of its influence, and so without. Motive. If so, this demonstrates the independence
of volition on Motive; and no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts,
even that “in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a motive
to induce it.”
If the Most High should endow a balance
with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequaled weights
are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend,
which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight; this would clearly
demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales;
at least, as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight
in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself
against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when
there is no weight at all.
Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot
stir at all without some Motive; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to
one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that motive.
This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on Motives; if it
were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little without
them; or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and
weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the will, when it has before
it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence
from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be
wholly independent on Motives.
It further appears, on Mr. Chubb’s hypothesis,
that volition must be without any previous ground in any motive, thus: if it be,
as he supposes, that the will is not determined by any previous superior strength
of the motive, but determines and chooses its own Motive, then, when the rival Motives
are exactly equal, in all respects, it may follow either; and may, in such a case,
sometimes follow one, sometimes the other. And if so, this diversity which appears
between the acts of the Will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the
Motives; for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and perfectly
the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that
is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the
consequent. Perfect identity in the ground, cannot be a reason why it is not followed
with the same consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence
must be sought for elsewhere.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however
much Mr. Chubb insists, that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce
it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind,
without reference to any superior strength of motives, picks and chooses for its
Motive to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes, that, with regard to the mind’s
preference of one Motive before another — it is not the motive that disposes the
Will, but — the will disposes itself to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be
utterly inconsistent with agency; and that to suppose a being to be an agent in
that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, p. 311. and throughout his discourses
on the subject of Liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency
or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action
and Passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action,
strictly speaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body
or mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only
as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary.
And yet, according to him, volition itself
is the effect of volition; yea, every act of free volition; and therefore every
act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from him, be necessary.
That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly
supposed by him. In p. 341, he says,” If a man is such a creature as I have proved
him to be, that is, if he has in him a power of Liberty of doing either good or
evil, and either of these is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might,
IF HE HAD PLEASED, have CHOSEN and done the contrary.” — Here he supposes all that
is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and so that his good or evil
choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, “he might
if he had PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary.” So in p 356, “Though it be highly
reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater good,— yet he may, if he
PLEASES, CHOOSE otherwise.” Which is the same thing as if he had said, he may if
He chooses choose otherwise. And then he goes on,—” that is, he may, if he pleases,
choose what is good for himself,” &c. And again in the same page,” The Will is not
confined by the understanding, to any particular sort of good, whether greater or
less; but it is at liberty to choose what kind of good it pleases.” — If there
be any meaning in the last words, it must be this, that the Will is at liberty to
choose what kind of good it chooses to choose; supposing the act of choice itself
determined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only
a man’s power to move his body, agreeable to an antecedent act of choice, but to
use or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379.) speaking of the faculties
of the mind, he says, ”Man has power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties,
to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he pleases.” And that he supposes an act
of choice or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to, those
acts thus chosen, directing, commanding, and producing the chosen acts, and even
the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283. “He can command his actions;
and herein consists his Liberty; he can give or deny himself that pleasure, as he
pleases. And p. 377. If the actions of men — are not the produce of a free choice,
or election, but spring from a necessity of nature,— he cannot in reason be the
object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether
good or evil, is the produce of will or free choice; so that a man in either case,
had it in his power, and was at liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper
object of reward or punishment, according as he chooses to behave himself.” Here,
in these last words, he speaks of Liberty of choosing according as he chooses. So
that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his choosing itself,
as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it is evident,
he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, When he speaks
of all free actions, as the PRODUCE of free choice. And this is abundantly evident
in what he says elsewhere, (p. 372, 373.)
Now these things imply a twofold great
inconsistence.
1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is commanded
by, and is the produce of, free choice, is to suppose the first free act of choice
belonging to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted,
to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labor at
all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very first act is
the produce of another act that went before it.
2. If it were both possible and real, as
Mr. Chubb insists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect
of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act
of choice would be free, but every one necessary; because, every act of choice being
the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with that
foregoing cause. For Mr. Chubb himself says, (p. 389.) “When the self-moving power
is exerted, it becomes the necessary cause of its effects.” — So that his notion
of a free act, that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It
is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necessary; and therefore
by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free. According to him, every
free act is the produce of a free act; so that there must be an infinite number
of free acts in succession, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning.
And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and
yet not any one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary
effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet the agent cannot, in
reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions.
He is active in them all, and passive in none; yet active in none, but passive in
all, &c.
V. Mr. Chubb most strenuously denies, that
Motives are causes of the acts of the Will; or that the moving principle in man
is moved, or caused to be exerted by motives. His words, (p. 388 and 389.) are,
“If the moving principle in man is Moved, or caused to be Exerted, by something
external to man, which all Motives are, then it would not be a self-moving principle,
seeing it would be moved by a principle external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving
principle is moved, or caused to be exerted, by a cause external to itself; is absurd
and a contradiction,” &c.— And in the next page, it is particularly and largely
insisted, that motives are causes in no case, that “they are merely passive in the
production of action, and have no causality in the production of it,— no causality,
to be the cause of the exertion of the will.
Now I desire it may be considered, how
this can possibly consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted here,
1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excitements of the acts of the Will;
and says, that motives do excite volition, and induce it, and that they are necessary
to this end; that in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take place
without motives to excite it. But now, if Motives excite the will, they move it;
and yet he says, it is absurd to say, the Will is moved by motives. And again, if
language is of any significance at all, if Motives excite volition, then they are
the cause of its being excited; and to cause volition to be excited, is to cause
it to be put forth or excited. Yea, Mr. Chubb says himself, (p. 317.) motive is
necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To excite, is positively to do
something; and certainly that which does something, is the cause of the thing done
by it. To create, is to cause to be created; to make, is to cause to be made; to
kill, is to cause to be killed; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened; and to
excite, is to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause, in the most proper
sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence.
The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come
forth into existence.
2. Mr. Chubb himself (p. 317.) speaks of
Motives as the ground and reason of action BY INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING INFLUENCE.
Now, what can be meant by a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of
a thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent and effectual?
3. This author not only speaks of Motives
as the ground and reason of action, by prevailing influence; but expressly of their
influence as prevailing for the production of an action, (p. 317.) which makes the
inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is
certainly the causing of an effect; and productive influence is causal influence,
if any thing is; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to
become the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such
thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action;
and yet, he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.
4. In the same page, he once and again
speaks of motives as disposing the Agent to action, by their influence. His words
are these: “As Motive, which takes place in the understanding, and is the product
of intelligence, is NECESSARY to action, that is, to the EXERTION of the active
faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some PREVIOUS REASON
TO DISPOSE the mind to action; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man
is said to be disposed to one action rather than another, this properly signifies
the PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one motive has upon a man FOR THE PRODUCTION of an
action, or for the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the production of
the contrary. For as motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive
that prevails, disposes the agent to the performance of that action.”
Now, if motives dispose the mind to action,
then they cause the mind to be disposed; and to cause the mind to be disposed is
to cause it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to will;
and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And yet this
same Mr. Chub holds it to be absurd, to suppose motive to be a cause of the act
of the Will.
And if we compare these things together,
we have here again a whole heap of inconsistencies. Motives are the previous ground
and reason of the acts of the Will; yea, the necessary ground and reason of their
exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things,
take place; and they do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by a prevailing
influence; yea, an influence which prevails for the production of the act of the
Will, and for the disposing of the mind to it; and yet it is absurd, to suppose
Motive to be a cause of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved
or caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the production of
it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.
A due consideration of these things which
Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange inconsistencies which his notion of Liberty—consisting
in the Will’s power of self-determination void of all necessity, united with that
dictate of common sense, that there can be no volition without a Motive—drove him
into, may be sufficient to convince us, that is utterly impossible ever to make
that notion of Liberty consistent with the influence of motives in volition. And
as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, or preference
of the mind, without some motive or inducement, something in the mind’s view which
it aims at, and goes after; so it is most manifest, that there is no such Liberty
in the universe as Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible, or conceivable.