238 INSTITUTES OF THE [bOOK U
liberty— the first, freedom from necessity, the second, freedom
from sin, the third, freedom from misery ; of which the first is
natm-ally inherent in man, so that nothing can ever deprive
him of it: the other two are lost by sin. This distinction [
readily admit, except that it improperly confounds necessity
with coaction. And the wide difference between these things.
with the necessity of its being considered, will appear in another
place.
VI. This being admitted will place it beyond all doubt, that
'/ man is not possessed of free will for good works, unless he be _.
\/ \ ^^^^i^^^^xdsi-Q^^^A^'aX^QQAdX grace which is bestowed on the
' e^TalonelnjiagenerationT^T^r I stop not to notice those fana-
tics, who pretend that grace is offered equally and promiscuously
to all. But it does not yet appear, whether he is altogether
deprived of power to do good, or whetherhe yet possesses some
power, though small and feeble ; which of itself can do nothing,
but by the assistance of grace does also perform its part. Lom-
bard, in order to establish this notion, informs us that two sorts of
grace are necessary to qualify us for the performance of good
works. One he calls operative, by which we efficaciously will
what is good ; the other cooperative, which attends as auxi-
liary to a good will. This division I dislike, because, while he
attributes an efficacious desire of what is good to the grace of
God, he insinuates that man has of his own nature antecedent,
though ineffectual, desires after what is good ; as Bernard as-
serts that a good will is the work of God, but yet allows that
man is self-impelled to desire such a good will. But this is
very remote from the meaning of Augustine, from whom, how-
ever, Lombard would be thought to have borrowed this division.
The second part of it offends me by its ambiguity, which has
produced a very erroneous interpretation. For they have sup-
posed that we cooperate with the second sort of Divine grace
^
because we have it in our power either to frustrate the first
sort by rejecting it, or to confirm it by our obedience to it.
The author of the treatise " On the Vocation of the Gentiles "
expresses it thus— that those who have the use of reason and
Judgment are at liberty to depart from grace, that they may be
rewarded for not having departed, and that what is impossible
without the cooperation of the Spirit, may be imputed to their
merits, by whose will it might have been prevented. These
two things I have thought proper to notice as I proceed, that
the reader may perceive how much I dissent from the sounder
schoolmen. For I differ considerably more froim the later
sophists, as they have departed much further from the judg-
ment of antiquity. However, we understand from this divi-
sion, in what sense they have ascribed free will to man. For
Lombard at length pronounces, that we are not therefore pos-