inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses of the indestructib-
ility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality,
actuating itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in
destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a
more proper occasion. That, however, there is but one single notion in indestructibility1163,
considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that the indestructibility of
the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son, no difference as to indestructibility
being observable either in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of
destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to assert, so as to preclude
the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father.
For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be dis-
puted in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather pre-
cisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces
him to assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility
not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference
between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he
well shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible
and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction,—and no degrees are to be
found in pure indestructibility,—how does he show that the Father cannot be compared
with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed
in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not
because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but
because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest
attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in
meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming, “God is
not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason
of energies.” If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because
either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be homogeneous,
inasmuch as it is through an energy, that they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically
tends is clear to every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my
own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive
1163 Indestructibility. Such terms (“not-composite,” “indivisible,” “imperishable”) were the inheritance which
Christian controversy received from the former struggle with Stoicism. In the hands of Origen, they had been
aimed at the Stoic doctrine of the Deity as that of corporeal Spirit, which does not perish, only because there is
no cause sufficient. “If one does not see the consequences of such an assertion, one ought to blush” (in Johann.
xiii. 21). The consequences of course are that God, the Word, and our souls, made in His image, are all perishable;
for all body, in that it is matter, is by the Stoic assumption, liable to change.
541
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.