Who conceded to you this, Eunomius, that the imperishability is not to be associated with
the whole life of God? Who ever divided that Life into two parts, and then put particular
names to each half of the Life, so that to the division which the one name fitted the other
could not be said to apply? This is the result of your dialectic sharpness; to say that the Life
which has no beginning is perishable, and that what is imperishable cannot be associated
with what is unbeginning! It is just as if, when one had said that man was rational, as well
as capable of speculation and knowledge, attaching each phrase to the subject of them ac-
cording to a different application and idea, some one was to jeer, and to go on in the same
strain, “If man is capable of speculation and knowledge, he cannot, as regards this, be rational,
but wherein he is capable of such knowledge, he is this and this only, and his nature does
not admit of his being the other”; and reversely, if rational were made the definition of man,
he were to deny in this case his being capable of this speculation and knowledge; for “wherein
he is rational, he is proved devoid of mind.” But if the ridiculousness and absurdity in this
case is plain to any one, neither in that former case is it at all doubtful. When you have read
the passage from the Master, you will find that his childish sophistry will vanish like a
shadow. In our case of the definition of man, the capability of knowledge is not hindered
by the possession of reason, nor the reason by the capability of knowledge: no more is the
eternity of the Divine Life deprived of imperishability, if it be unbeginning, or of beginning-
lessness, if we recognize its imperishability. This would-be seeker after truth, with the artifices
of his dialectic shrewdness, inserts in our argument what comes from his own repertoire;
and so he fights with himself and overthrows himself, without ever touching anything of
ours. For our position was nothing but this; that the Life as existing without beginning is
styled, by means of a fresh Conception, as ungenerate: is styled, I say, not, is made such;
and that we mark the Life as going on into infinity with the appellation of imperishable;
mark it, I say, as such, not, make it such; and that the result is, that while it is a property of
the Divine Life, inherent in the subject, to be infinite in both views, the thoughts associated
with that subject are expressed in this way or in that only as regards that particular term
which indicates the thought expressed. One thought associated with that life is, that it does
not exist from any cause; this is indicated by the term “ungenerate.” Another thought about
it is, that it is limitless and endless; this is represented by the word imperishable. Thus, while
the subject remains what it is, above everything, whether name or thought, the not being
from any cause, and the not changing into the non-existent, are signified by means of the
Conception implied in the aforesaid words.
What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly,
in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in these words: “He will, then, be, as
unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable
and generated.” It is plain to any possessing the least reflection, without our testing this lo-
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.