ence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For
they must see, that consent to being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of beings,
is most just; and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows
from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence.
Thus has God established and ordered that this principle of natural conscience, which,
though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to being in general, nor any delight
in such a principle, simply considered, and so implies no truly spiritual sense or virtuous
taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned
by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste. And that moral sense which is natural to mankind, so
far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural
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conscience.
The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition to approve virtue, and disapprove
vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the
writings of many of late. A misunderstanding of this, seems to have misled those moralists
who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an
evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted
in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments used by these writers, indeed prove, that
there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-
love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject,
and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men’s approbation of virtue, which
they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation
of virtue which arises from self-love. But other instances prove, that there is a moral taste,
or sense of moral good and evil, natural to all, which do not properly arise from self-love.
Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natural
conscience, and particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in the approbation
of natural conscience, viz. a sense of desert, and approbation of that natural agreement there
is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what has been said, that
neither this, nor any thing else wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil, which
there is in natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of
mind to relish and delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous be-
nevolence of heart.
But it further appears from this; if the approbation of conscience were the same with the
approbation of the inclination of the heart, or the natural disposition and determination of
the mind to love and be pleased with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of con-
science would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind; or rather, the
degree would be just the same. In that person who had a high degree of a virtuous temper,
therefore, the testimony of conscience in favour of virtue would be equally full: But he who
had but little, would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and
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CHAPTER V. Natural conscience, and the moral sense.