suppose that the thing wherein the Will exercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts.
But how can this be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the soul, cannot
exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise itself. So
that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determ-
ining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the Will in determining all its own free acts,
then one free act of the Will is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every
free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or ex-
ercise of the Will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining
them. From whence it follows, that no liberty consists in the Will’s power to determine its
own acts: or, which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a
self-determining power of the Will.
If it should be said, That although it be true, if the soul determines its own volitions, it
must be active in so doing, and the determination itself must be an act; yet there is no need
of supposing this act to be prior to the volition determined; but the Will or soul determines
the act of the Will in willing; it determines its own volition, in the very act of volition; it
directs and limits the act of the Will, causing it to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the
act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must
mean one of these three things: either, (1.) That the determining act, though it be before
the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That
the determining act is not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature,
nor is truly distinct from it; but that the soul’s determining the act of volition is the same
thing with its exerting the act of volition: the mind’s exerting such a particular act, is its
causing and determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is no effect; but
comes into existence, with such a particular determination, without any ground or reason
of its existence and determination.—I shall consider these distinctly.
(1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in
order of time, it will not help the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before the
determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as
much proves it to be distinct from, and independent on it, as if it were before in the order
of time. As the cause of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direction, may
have no distance as to time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but must
be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before its effect in the order of time: as the
architect is distinct from the house which he builds, or the father distinct from the son which
he begets. And if the act of the Will determining be distinct from the act determined, and
before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to
the first in the series, which has no act of the Will before it in the order of nature, determining
it; and consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so not a free act, in this notion
of freedom. And this being the act which determines all the rest, none of them are free acts.
547
SECTION II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered.…