30. But
will he not be
terrified by
3599
the
punishments in Hades, of which we have heard, assuming also,
as they
do
, many forms of torture? And who
3600
will be so senseless and ignorant of
consequences,
3601
as to believe
that to imperishable spirits either the darkness of Tartarus, or rivers
of fire, or marshes with miry abysses, or wheels sent whirling through
the air,
3602
can in any wise
do harm? For that which is beyond reach, and not subject to the
laws of destruction, though it be surrounded by all the flames of the
raging streams, be rolled in the mire, overwhelmed by the fall of
overhanging rocks and by the overthrow of huge mountains, must remain
safe and untouched without suffering any deadly harm.
Moreover, that conviction not only leads on to
wickedness, from the very freedom to sin
which it suggests
, but
even takes away the ground of philosophy itself, and asserts that it is
vain to undertake its study, because of the difficulty of the work,
which leads to no result. For if it is true that souls know no
end, and are ever
3603
advancing
with all generations, what danger is there in giving themselves up to
the pleasures of sense—despising and neglecting the virtues by
regard to
which life is more stinted
in its pleasures
,
and
becomes
less attractive—and in letting loose their
boundless lust to range eagerly and unchecked through
3604
all kinds of debauchery?
Is it
the danger
of being worn out by such pleasures, and corrupted by
vicious effeminacy? And how can that be corrupted which is
immortal, which always exists, and
is
subject to no
suffering?
Is it the danger
of being polluted by foul and
base deeds? And how can that be defiled which has no corporeal
substance; or where can corruption seat itself, where there is no place
on which the mark of this very corruption should fasten?
But again, if souls draw near to the gates of
death,
3605
as is laid down
in the doctrine of Epicu
rus, in this case, too, there is no
sufficient reason why philosophy should be sought out, even if it is
true that by it
3606
souls are
cleansed and made pure from all uncleanness.
3607
For if they all
3608
die, and even in the body
3609
the feeling
characteristic of life perishes, and is lost;
3610
it is not only a very great mistake, but
shows
stupid blindness, to curb innate desires, to restrict your
mode of life within narrow limits, not yield to your inclinations, and
do what our passions have demanded and urged, since no rewards await
you for so great toil when the day of death comes, and you shall be
freed from the bonds of the body.
3599
So
the ellipse is usually supplied, but it seems simpler and is more
natural thus: “But punishments (have been) spoken of”
(
memoratæ
), etc.
3600
So
ms.
and Oehler, for which the edd.
read
ec quis
, “will any one.”
3601
Lit.,
“the consequences of things.”
3602
Lit.,
“the moving of wheels whirling.”
3603
Lit., “in the unbroken course of
ages”—
perpetuitate ævorum.
3604
Lit.,
“and to scatter the unbridled eagerness of boundless lust
through,” etc.
3605
Lucretius (iii. 417 sqq.) teaches at great length that the soul and
mind are mortal, on the ground that they consist of atoms smaller than
those of vapour, so that, like it, on the breaking of their case, they
will be scattered abroad; next, on the ground of the analogy between
them and the body in regard to disease, suffering, etc.; of their
ignorance of the past, and want of developed qualities; and finally, on
the ground of the adaptation of the soul to the body, as of a fish to
the sea, so that life under other conditions would be impossible.
3606
The
ms.
and first four edd. read
has
, “that these souls,” etc.; in the other edd.,
hac
is received as above from the margin of Ursinus.
3607
Cf. Plato,
Phædo
(st. p. 64 sq.), where death is
spoken of as only a carrying further of that separation of the soul
from the pleasures and imperfections of the body which the philosopher
strives to effect in this life.
3608
Lit., “in common.”
3609
Pl.
3610
This
refers to the second argument of Lucretius noticed above.