our stand upon the tenets of the Church, and assert that it will be well to accept only so
much of these speculations as is sufficient to show that those who indulge in them are to a
certain extent in accord with the doctrine of the Resurrection. Their statement, for instance,
that the soul after its release from this body insinuates itself into certain other bodies is not
absolutely out of harmony with the revival which we hope for. For our view, which maintains
that the body, both now, and again in the future, is composed of the atoms of the universe,
is held equally by these heathens. In fact, you cannot imagine any constitution of the body
independent of a concourse1864 of these atoms. But the divergence lies in this: we assert that
the same body again as before, composed of the same atoms, is compacted around the soul;
they suppose that the soul alights on other bodies, not only rational, but irrational and even
insensate; and while all are agreed that these bodies which the soul resumes derive their
substance from the atoms of the universe, they part company from us in thinking that they
are not made out of identically the same atoms as those which in this mortal life grew around
the soul. Let then, this external testimony stand for the fact that it is not contrary to probab-
ility that the soul should again inhabit a body; after that however, it is incumbent upon us
to make a survey of the inconsistencies of their position, and it will be easy thus, by means
of the consequences that arise as we follow out the consistent view, to bring the truth to
light. What, then, is to be said about these theories? This that those who would have it that
the soul migrates into natures divergent from each other seem to me to obliterate all natural
distinctions; to blend and confuse together, in every possible respect, the rational, the irra-
tional, the sentient, and the insensate; if, that is, all these are to pass into each other, with
no distinct natural order1865 secluding them from mutual transition. To say that one and
the same soul, on account of a particular environment of body, is at one time a rational and
intellectual soul, and that then it is caverned along with the reptiles, or herds with the birds,
or is a beast of burden, or a carnivorous one, or swims in the deep; or even drops down to
an insensate thing, so as to strike out roots or become a complete tree, producing buds on
branches, and from those buds a flower, or a thorn, or a fruit edible or noxious—to say this,
is nothing short of making all things the same and believing that one single nature runs
through all beings; that there is a connexion between them which blends and confuses
hopelessly all the marks by which one could be distinguished from another. The philosopher
who asserts that the same thing may be born in anything intends no less than that all things
are to be one; when the observed differences in things are for him no obstacle to mixing
together things which are utterly incongruous. He makes it necessary that, even when one
sees one of the creatures that are venom-darting or carnivorous, one should regard it, in
1864 συνδρομῆς
1865 εἰρμῷ, i.e. as links in a chain which cannot be altered. Sifanus’ “carcere et claustro” is due to εἱργμῷ
against all the mss. Krabinger’s six have διατειχιζόμενα for διαστοιχιζόμενα of the Editt.
844
On the Soul and the Resurrection.