viduals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence,
and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system—such limited private bene-
volence, not arising from, not being subordinate to, benevolence to being in general, cannot
have the nature of true virtue. However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now, that it
is evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from
these two things.
First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue. A principle of virtue, I think, is
owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or
public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to being simply con-
sidered; which implies a disposition to benevolence to being in general. Now, by the suppos-
ition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether
we suppose they arise from self-love, or from particular instincts: because either of those
sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And,
Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and
they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This
appears from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detached and
unsubordinate operation rather implies opposition to being in general, than general bene-
volence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same
reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal exist-
ence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person. Now
upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not arise from a virtuous
principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true
virtue.
For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons have a be-
nevolent affection limited to a party, or to the nation in general, of which they are a part,
or the public community to which they belong, though it be as large as the Roman empire
was of old; yea, if there could be cause determining a person to benevolence towards the
whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, ex-
clusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God—not derived from that
temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him nor subordinate to such divine
love—it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct, much more
indisputably does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree
with Hutchison and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections
between the sexes, diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and which do not
properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual
benevolence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with
any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes,
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CHAPTER VI. Of particular instincts of nature