So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an
infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable
parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of
absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute
and infinite duration. It is as improper, to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence
of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the in-
finite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity
and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally
obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the other; and there is equal reason in each
case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months
and years of the Divine Existence, as of square miles of Deity: and we equally deceive
ourselves, when we talk of the world being differently fixed, with respect to either of these
sorts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been
differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or, that it might have
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been differently fixed in the long line of eternity: and all arguments and objections, which
are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are
buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air.
2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thine rather than another,
without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God’s actually placing
in different parts of the world, panicles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and
alike. The forementioned author says, (p. 78, &c.) “If one would descend to the minute
specific particles, of which different bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason
to believe, that there are thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are
perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the Will of God, where
to place them.” He there instances in particles of water, of which there are such immense
numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this world; and the infinite myriads of
the luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the sun; so many, that it would
be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.
Answ. (1.) To this I answer: that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely divisible, it
is very unlikely, that any two of all these particles are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely,
that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise: and that al-
though we should allow a great similarity between the different particles of water and fire,
as to their general nature and figure; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it
is infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and
quantity of matter.—If we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature with the
globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly
the same number of particles of dust and water in them. But infinitely less strange, than that
two particles of light should have just the same quantity of matter. For a particle of light,
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…