Chapter I.
But since our system of religion is wont to observe a distinction of persons in the unity
of the Nature, to prevent our argument in our contention with Greeks sinking to the level
of Judaism there is need again of a distinct technical statement in order to correct all error
on this point.
473
For not even by those who are external to our doctrine is the Deity held to be without
Logos1941. Now this admission of theirs will quite enable our argument to be unfolded. For
he who admits that God is not without Logos, will agree that a being who is not without
Logos (or word) certainly possesses Logos. Now it is to be observed that the utterance of
man is expressed by the same term. If, then, he should say that he understands what the
Logos of God is according to the analogy of things with us, he will thus be led on to a loftier
idea, it being an absolute necessity for him to believe that the utterance, just as everything
else, corresponds with the nature. Though, that is, there is a certain sort of force, and life,
and wisdom, observed in the human subject, yet no one from the similarity of the terms
would suppose that the life, or power, or wisdom, were in the case of God of such a sort as
that, but the significations of all such terms are lowered to accord with the standard of our
nature. For since our nature is liable to corruption and weak, therefore is our life short, our
strength unsubstantial, our word unstable1942. But in that transcendent nature, through the
greatness of the subject contemplated, every thing that is said about it is elevated with it.
Therefore though mention be made of God’s Word it will not be thought of as having its
realization in the utterance of what is spoken, and as then vanishing away, like our speech,
into the nonexistent. On the contrary, as our nature, liable as it is to come to an end, is endued
with speech which likewise comes to an end, so that, imperishable and ever-existing nature
has eternal, and substantial speech. If, then, logic requires him to admit this eternal subsist-
ence of God’s Word, it is altogether necessary to admit also that the subsistence1943 of that
1941 the Deity…without Logos. In another treatise (De Fide, p. 40) Gregory bases the argument for the
eternity of the Λόγος on John i. 1, where it is not said, “after the beginning,” but “in the beginning.” The beginning,
therefore, never was without the Λόγος.
1942 unstable: ἀπαγὴς (the reading ἅρπαγις is manifestly wrong). So afterwards human speech is called
ἐπίκηρος. Cf. Athanasius (Contr. Arian. 3): “Since man came from the non-existent, therefore his ‘word’ also
has a pause, and does not last. From man we get, day after day, many different words, because the first abide
not, but are forgotten.”
1943 ὑπόστασιν. About this oft repeated word the question arises whether we are indebted to Christians or
to Platonists for the first skilful use of it in expressing that which is neither substance nor quality. Abraham
Tucker (Light of Nature, ii. p. 191) hazards the following remark with regard to the Platonic Triad, i.e. Goodness,
Intelligence, Activity, viz. that quality would not do as a general name for these principles, because the ideas
and abstract essences existed in the Intelligence, &c., and qualities cannot exist in one another, e.g. yellowness
cannot be soft: nor could substance be the term, for then they must have been component parts of the Existent,
Chapter I
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Chapter I