CHAP. XL] MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING, AND AVILL. 259
and to enjoy, is to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but
of the actual thing. Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses ;
for he takes up something into the power of the will, wherein
he also is satisfied as with an end. But not every one who
uses, enjoys, if he has sought after that, which he takes up
into the power of the will, not on account of the thing itself,
hut on account of something else.
18. Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will,
are not three lives, but one life ; nor three minds, but one
mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three sub-
stances, but one substance. Since memory, which is called
life, and mind, and substance, is so called in respect to itself;
but it is called memory, relatively to something. And I
should say the same also of understanding and of will, since
they are called understanding and will relatively to something ;
but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence.
And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one
mind, one essence ; and whatever else they are severally
called in respect to themselves, they are called also together,
not plurally, but in the singular number. But they are three,
in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other ; and
if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but
also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each
other ; for not only is each contained by each, but also all by
each. For I remember that I havememory, and understanding,
and will ; and I understand that I understand, and will, and
remember ; and I will that I will, and remember, and under-
stand ; and I remember together my whole memory, and
understanding, and will. For that ofmy memory which I do
not remember, is not in my memory ; and nothing is so much
in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the
whole memory. Also, whatever I understand I know that I
understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but
whatever I know I remember. Therefore I reiiiember the
whole ofmy understanding, and the whole ofmy will. Like-
wise,when I understand these three things, I understand them
together as whole. For there is none of things intelligible
which I do not understand, except what I do not know ; but
what I do not know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore^