the other, which is the negation of end, as amongst the externals of that being. It is difficult
to see the reason for thus assigning the negation of beginning to the realm of being, while
they banish the negation of end outside that realm. The two are our conceptions of the same
thing; and, therefore, either both should be admitted to the definition of being, or, if the
one is to be judged inadmissible, the other should be rejected also. If, however, they are de-
termined thus to divide the thought of eternity, and to make the one fall within the realm
of that being, and to reckon the other with the non-realities of Deity (for the thoughts which
they adopt on this subject are grovelling, and, like birds who have shed their feathers, they
are unable to soar into the sublimities of theology), I would advise them to reverse their
teaching, and to count the unending as being, overlooking the unoriginate rather, and as-
signing the palm to that which is future and excites hope, rather than to that which is past
and stale. Seeing, I say (and I speak thus owing to their narrowness of spirit, and lower the
discussion to the level of a child’s conception), the past period of his life is nothing to him
who has lived it, and all his interest is centred on the future and on that which can be looked
forward to, that which has no end will have more value than that which has no beginning.
So let our thoughts upon the divine nature be worthy and exalted ones; or else, if they are
going to judge of it according to human tests, let the future be more valued by them than
the past, and let them confine the being of the Deity to that, since time’s lapse sweeps away
with it all existence in the past, whereas expected existence gains substance from our hope230.
Now I broach these ridiculously childish suggestions as to children sitting in the market-
place and playing231; for when one looks into the grovelling earthliness of their heretical
teaching it is impossible to help falling into a sort of sportive childishness. It would be right,
however, to add this to what we have said, viz., that, as the idea of eternity is completed only
by means of both (as we have already argued), by the negation of a beginning and also by
that of an end, if they confine God’s being to the one, their definition of this being will be
manifestly imperfect and curtailed by half; it is thought of only by the absence of beginning,
and does not contain the absence of end within itself as an essential element. But if they do
combine both negations, and so complete their definition of the being of God, observe,
again, the absurdity that is at once apparent in this view; it will be found, after all their efforts,
to be at variance not only with the Only-begotten, but with itself. The case is clear and does
not require much dwelling upon. The idea of a beginning and the idea of an end are opposed
each to each; the meanings of each differ as widely as the other diametric oppositions232,
where there is no half-way proposition below233. If any one is asked to define ‘beginning,’
230 Cf. Heb. xi. 1, of faith, ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις πραγμάτων
231 Luke vii. 32.
232 κατὰ διάμετρον ἀλλήλοις ἀντικειμένων, i.e. Contradictories in Logic.
233 As in A or E, both of which have the Particular below them (I or O) as a half-way to the contrary Universal.
Thus— A I E
188
Explanation of 'Ungenerate,' and a 'study' of Eternity.