SECT. X.
Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations
on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings about the Freedom of the
Will.
That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already
proved) has a necessary connexion with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of con-
nexion and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the Will whatsoever is excited
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by some motive: which is manifest, because, if the mind, in willing after the manner it does,
is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or
pursues in so doing; it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it
does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing, Which
brings the matter to a contradiction; because for the mind to will something, and for it to
go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.
But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the cause of the
act. If the acts of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the causes of their being
excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of
the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their Motives. Motives do nothing, as Motives
or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect
of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence
of something else.
And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are necessarily con-
nected with their Motives. Every effect and event being as was proved before, necessarily
connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is
manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the Will:
the volition, which is caused by previous Motive and inducement, is not caused by the Will
exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause, and excite volitions in itself.
This is not consistent with the Will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to de-
termine itself to a preference; for the way in which Motives operate, is by biassing the Will,
and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way.
Here it may he proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb in his Collection of Tracts on Various
Subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thor-
oughly subversive of itself: and that many ways.
1. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and
excitement; and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never
otherwise in any instance. He says, (p. 262.) “No action can take place without some Motive
to excite it.” And, (p. 263,) “Volition cannot take place without some previous reason or
motive to induce it.” And, (p. 310.) Action would not take place without some reason or
Motive to induce it; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without
SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives; with particular observations of the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedom of the Will.
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…