§4. Second Five Years.
This period was most momentous for the world’s history. Maxentius, seeking an excuse
for war against Constantine, found it in a pretended desire to avenge his father (Zos. 2. 14),
and prepared for war.3013 Like his father before him, however, he did not know his man.
Constantine’s mind was prepared. He was alert and ready to act. He gathered all the forces,
German, Gallic, and British (Zos. 2. 15) that he could muster, left a portion for the protection
of the Rhine, entered Italy by way of the Alps (Paneg.), and marched to meet the much more
numerous forces of Maxentius,—Romans, Italians, Tuscans, Carthagenians, and Sicilians
(Zos. 2. 15).3014 First Sigusium was taken by storm (Naz. Paneg. [321] c. 17 and 21; Paneg.
[313] c. 5); then the cavalry of Maxentius was defeated at Turin (Naz. Paneg. [321] c. 22;
Paneg. [313] c. 6). After a few days’ rest in Milan (Paneg. [313] c. 7) he continued his tri-
umphant march, defeating the enemy again in a cavalry engagement at Brescia (Naz. Paneg.
c. 25), and taking the strongly fortified Verona after a hard-fought battle before the walls
(Anon. Vales. p. 473; Paneg. [313]; Naz. Paneg. c. 25–26). This had taken him out of his way
a little; but now there were no enemies in the rear, and he was free to push on to Rome, on
his way whither, if not earlier, he had his famous vision of the cross.3015 He reached the
Tiber October 26. Maxentius, tempted by a dubious oracle3016 issued from Rome, crossed
the Tiber, and joined battle. His apparently unwise action in staking so much on a pitched
battle has its explanation, if we could believe Zosimus (2. 15), Eusebius (V. C. 1. 38),
Praxagoras, and others. His object was, it is said, by a feigned retreat to tempt Constantine
across the bridge of boats which he had built in such a way that it could be broken, and the
3013 Eusebius represents the occasion of Constantine’s movement as a philanthropic compassion for the
people of Rome (V. C. 1. 26; H. E. 9. 9). Praxagoras (ed. Müller, p. 1) says distinctly that it was to avenge those
who suffered under the tyrannical rule of Maxentius and Nazarius (Paneg. c. 19), that it was “for liberating Italy.”
So, too, Nazarius (Paneg. [321] c. 27), Zonaras (13. 1), Cedrenus, and Ephraem (p. 22) speak of a legation of the
Romans petitioning him to go. Undoubtedly he did pity them, and as to the legation, every Roman who found
his way to Trèves must have been an informal ambassador asking help. The fact seems to be that he had long
suspected Maxentius (Zos. 2. 15), and now, learning of his preparations for war, saw that his suspicions were
well grounded. Whatever underlying motive of personal ambition there may have been, it is probable that the
philanthropic motive was his justification and pretext to his own conscience for the attempt to rid himself of
this suspected and dangerous neighbor. Zosimus being Zosimus, it is probable that Maxentius was the aggressor
if he says so.
3014 Constantine numbered, according to Zosimus, 90,000 foot, 8,000 horse; and Maxentius, 170,000 foot,
and 18,000 horse. According to Panegyr. (313) c. 3, he left the major part of his army to guard the Rhine and
went to meet a force of 100,000 men with less than 40,000 (c. 5).
3015 See note on Bk. I. c. 28.
3016 That “on the same day the enemy of the Romans should perish” (Lact. c. 44.).
Second Five Years.
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Second Five Years.