SECT. II.
Some further observations concerning those things which reason leads us to suppose God
aimed at in the creation of the world.
From what was last observed, it seems to be the most proper way of proceeding—as we
would see what light reason will give us, respecting the particular end or ends, God had ul-
timately in view in the creation of the world—to consider, what thing or things are actually
the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable
in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious
metaphysical inquiries, wherein fitness, or amiableness, consists; referring what I say to the
dictates of the reader’s mind, on sedate and calm reflection.
1. It seems a thing in itself proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God,
which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the production
of such effects as might manifest his infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c.
If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The
power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever have been
dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no
exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding, or disposal of things; for there
would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of God’s
justice, goodness, and truth. Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed
these attributes, if they never had been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then, if the
attributes which consist in a sufficiencyfor correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent,
the exercises of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing, that there should
be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency
must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless
the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any work is no further valuable, than
the work itself is valuable 195 . As God therefore esteems these attributes themselves valuable,
and delights in them; so it is natural to suppose that he delights in their proper exercise and
expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and
dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the
same reason, as he delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things ac-
cording to truth and just proportion; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself.
195 “The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his sermon at the opening of the presbyterian church of
Philadelphia) is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections
no to be exerted would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what use would God’s wisdom be, it had nothing
to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness, if it never brought any thing to pass ? And of what avail
his goodness, if it never did any good?”
SECTION II. What reason supposes.
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SECTION II. What reason supposes.