heart, by so much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore,
has he of moral Inability to the good required. His moral Inability consisting in the strength
of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness consists; and yet, according
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to Arminian principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness; and by how much
the more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wickedness.
Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability alone (which consists in
disinclination) never renders any thing improperly the subject matter of Precept or Com-
mand, and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of conformity to a com-
mand.
Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or external hindrance,
(which alone is properly called Inability,) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing
improperly the matter of Command. If men are excused from doing or acting any good
thing, supposed to be commanded, it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not
in the Will itself, but either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circum-
stances.—Here two or three things may be observed,
1. As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of the Will itself,
or of the affections, (which are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will,) if persons
are justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of understanding.
Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required
of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men
cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to
see, or hear of, or know in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human
understanding. But the insufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being insufficient
arises not from the moral state of the Will or inclination itself, but from the state of the
natural understanding. The great kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insuf-
ficient to excite gratitude in the person that receives the kindness, through his vile and un-
grateful temper: in this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the Will
or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to
excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the state
and measure of the person’s faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural Inability,
which entirely excuses it.
2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist
in the imminent acts or state of the Will itself—but are supposed to be required as effects
of the Will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding—that Inability,
and that only, excuses, which consists in want of connexion between them and the Will. If
the Will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of
nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural In-
ability to the thing required. For the Will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…