Chapter 6.—What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause of the Misery of the Wicked. Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is.  And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence.  And this vice, what else is it called than pride?  For “pride is the beginning of sin.” 530   They were unwilling, then, to preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him.  This was the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched. If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is none.  For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad?  And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will.  For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will.  If it has, the will is either good or bad.  If good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good will makes a will bad?  For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition.  On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it so; and that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the first evil will bad?  For that is not the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made evil by no other will.  For if it were preceded by that which made it evil, that will was first which made the other evil.  But if it is replied, “Nothing made it evil; it always was evil,” I ask if it has been existing in some nature.  For if not, then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good.  And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure.  For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called evil.  But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good.  And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it.  If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it?  The only thing that can be suggested in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil.  I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it?  If superior, then it is better.  How, then, has it no will, and not rather a good will?  The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will.  Then remains the supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will.  But that thing, be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its own kind and order.  How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will?  How, I say, can good be the cause of evil?  For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil—not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked.  Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing.  For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other?  What produces it in the man in whom it exists?  Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will.  Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked?  But why did not the flesh of the other?  Or was it the disposition?  But why not the disposition of both?  For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body and soul.  Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit?  As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever!  This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil suasive influence,—what was the cause of it, we ask?  For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity?  And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical?  The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence.  However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil.  For if we say that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good?  Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both.  Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad?  Then, why did he do so?  Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing?  We shall find that the latter is the case.  For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good or that good is the cause of evil?  And how can it come to pass that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any evil—that is to say, should make the will itself wicked? 530     Eccles. x. 13 .