For there is no difference between saying “Attend unto,” “Look,” and “See.” Since, then, the
seer must look towards some sight, God is rightly called the Seer of that which is to be seen.
We are taught, then, by this word one sectional operation of the Divine Being, though we
do not grasp in thought by means of it His substance itself, believing nevertheless that the
Divine glory suffers no loss because of our being at a loss for a naturally appropriate name.
For this inability to give expression to such unutterable things, while it reflects upon the
poverty of our own nature, affords an evidence of God’s glory, teaching us as it does, in the
words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally appropriate to God is to believe Him to
be “above every name1206.” That he transcends every effort of thought, and is far beyond
any circumscribing by a name, constitutes a proof to man of His ineffable majesty1207.
Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in ref-
erence to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, unencumbered with argu-
ment, for the benefit of our candid hearers; as for Eunomius’ nerveless contentions about
these names, we judge it a thing disgraceful and unbecoming to us seriously to confute them.
For what could one say in answer to a man who declares that we “attach more weight to the
outward form of the name than to the value of the thing named, giving to names the
prerogative over realities, and equality to things unequal”? Such are the words that he gives
utterance to. Well, let any one who can do so considerately, judge whether this calumnious
charge of his against us has anything in it dangerous enough to make it worth our while to
defend ourselves as to our “giving to names the prerogative over realities”; for it is plain to
every one that there is no single name that has in itself any substantial reality, but that every
name is but a recognizing mark placed on some reality or some idea, having of itself no ex-
istence either as a fact or a thought.
1206 Philip. ii. 9.
1207 The theology of Gregory and his master Origen rises above the unconscious Stoicism of Tertullian, and
even that of Clement, which has an air of materialistic pantheism about it, owing to his attempt, like that of
Eunomius, to base our knowledge of God upon abstractions and analogies drawn from nature. The result, indeed,
of the “abstraction process” of Clement is only a multiplication of negative terms, “immensity,” “simplicity,”
“eternity,” &c. But they will lead to nothing, if there is not already behind them all some positive idea which we
have received from a different source. Faith is this source; it is described by Origen as “an ineffable grace of the
soul which comes from God in a kind of enthusiasm;” which formula expresses the primary fact of religious
consciousness such as Leibnitz demonstrated it: and the positive idea supplied by this faculty is with Origen
Goodness (rather than the Good). He would put Will as well as Mind into the Central Idea of Metaphysics, and
would have the heart governed as well as the reason. All that he says about the “incomprehensibility” of God
does not militate against this: for we must have some idea of that which is incomprehensible to us: and the
Goodness of the Deity is the side on which we gain this idea.
578
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.