as to its moral quality, and every event, are of decretive appointment, in subserviency to ultimate good, must
allow, in order to be tolerably consistent, that the Supreme Being is “the only proper agent in the universe;” (
Belsham’s Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, p. 254.) and thus reduce human agency, and things else
called agency in a creature, to an appointed necessary choice, however odious in its nature, mischievious in its
tendency, or painful in experience. Thus, according to them, God is the only proper agent in all foul crimes and
horrid blasphemies, on earth and in hell! They have a right to define their terms, and to say what they mean by
agency in God, or in a creature, and to state their hypothesis accordingly; but others also have a right to deduce
the genuine consequences of that hypothesis, and to show wherein its error lies.—The design of these notes is
not to excite a spirit of unprofitable controversy, but to assist the serious inquirer in detecting errors and recog-
nizing truths of radical importance in ethics and theology; and, it is hoped, that to promote these ends the fol-
lowing observations may conduce. 1. It is granted, that in reference to natural acts, the Supreme Being is the
“only proper agent in the universe,” as they all spring from his energy. In this respect he is the first cause of all
causes, efficiently; and the description of the post is philosophically just: he “Warms in the sun, refreshes in the
breeze, Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees, Lives through all life, extends through all extent, Spreads
undivided, operates unspent.” POPE 2. It is also granted, that, in all acts morally good, the created agent is the
subject of necessity several ways. He has an active nature from decretive necessity, which it is not in his power
to alter. He is also, accordingly, compelled to some act of choice, from the activity of his nature. He is, moreover,
the subject of physical influence of a holy and purifying nature, whereby the goodness of his choice is infallibly
secured; and without which there could be no assignable ground of certainty that any action would be morally
good. There is also a necessity of connexion, arising from the nature of things, or the essence of truth, first
between the disposition and the act, or that the act will be of the same nature, morally considered, with the dis-
position from which it proceeds; and secondly, between the act and the end, or consequent, which is happiness.
3. It is moreover allowed, that in all acts morally evil, the soul is passive in reference to that necessity of dependence
which is inseparable from a created nature, which may be called passive power; without which the existence of
moral evil would be impossible. This necessity also arises form the nature of things, not from decree; for no
decree can alter its existence, (though it may, and actually does, counteract it.) any more than it can alter the
state of a creature from dependence into independence on the first cause. A creature without passive power in-
volves the most palpable absurdities. For its very definition is, “that property in a creature whereby it differs
essentially form the independence, self-sufficience, and indefectibility of the Creator;” and to deny it, is to suppose
that a creature may be independent, self-sufficient, and indefectible - that in these respects the creature and the
Creator are on a par—that a necessary and a contingent being are the same, in those very things which constitute
their essential difference! Were it not for this property in an agent, he could never sin; for all his acts would be
physically necessary, without any hypothetical medium, or moral alternative. 4. He is a moral agent, whose vo-
litions might have been otherwise than they are, if the motives, and consequently the state of his mind, had been
otherwise. But to suppose that his volitions might have been otherwise than they are, the motives and the state
of the mind being the same, would be to make him in his volitions the sport of chance, or a mere non-entity. 5.
He then is a moral agent who has, in reference to volition, a moral alternative, or a hypothetical possibility of a
different choice. Where this alternative, or this possibility, is not, there the agent (if he may be so called) is not
morally obliged, and therefore is not accountable. 6. But if so, where does the ground of such an alternative lie?
682
SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…