In the apostolic age, and the generations immediately succeeding, it was the privilege of every Christian to take part in the public meetings of the Church in the way of teaching or prophesying, the only condition being the consciousness of guidance by the Spirit (see 1 Cor. xiii.). We cannot call this teaching and prophesying preaching in our sense of the term. The services seem rather to have resembled our “open prayer-meetings.” Gradually, as the services became more formal and stereotyped, a stated address by the “president” (as Justin calls him) became a regular part of the service (see Justin’s Apol. I. 67), and we may assume that the liberty of teaching or prophesying in the public meetings did not now belong to all the members as it had in the beginning. The sermon, in our sense of the word, seems to have been a slow growth, but a direct development from this exhortation of the president mentioned by Justin. The confinement of the speaking (or preaching) to a single individual,—the leader,—which we see in Justin, is what we find in subsequent generations quite generally established. It becomes, in time, the prerogative of the bishop to preach, and this prerogative he confers upon his presbyters also (not universally, but in most cases), while deacons and laymen are almost everywhere excluded from the right. We see from the present chapter, however, that the custom was not the same in all parts of the Church in the time of Origen. The principle had evidently before this become firmly established in Alexandria that only bishops and presbyters should preach. But in Palestine no such rule was recognized as binding. At the same time, it is clear enough that it was exceptional even there for laymen to preach (in the presence of their bishops), for Alexander in his epistle, instead of saying that laymen preach everywhere and of right, cites particular instances of their preaching, and says that where they are qualified they are especially requested by the bishops to use their gifts; so that the theory that the prerogative belonged of right to the bishop existed there just as truly as in Alexandria. Origen of course knew that he was acting contrary to the custom (if not the canon) of his own church in thus preaching publicly, and yet undoubtedly he took it for granted that he was perfectly right in doing what these bishops requested him to do in their own dioceses. They were supreme in their own churches, and he knew of nothing, apparently, which should hinder him from doing what they approved of, while in those churches. Demetrius, however, thought otherwise, and considered the public preaching of an unordained man irregular, in any place and at any time. Whether jealousy of Origen’s growing power had anything to do with his action it is difficult to say with certainty. He seems to have treated Origen in a perfectly friendly way after his return; and yet it is possible that the difference of opinion on this point, and the reproof given by Demetrius, may not have been wholly without influence upon their subsequent relations, which became in the end so painful (see chap. 8, note 4).