in speaking of Him also by the appellation of Son we neither denote simplicity of substance,
nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son, but the term Son we hold to indicate that
He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple we hold to mean what the word
bears upon its face. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one
and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there
is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not
contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father
being ungenerate, His essence should, because that essence is simple, be defined by the term
ungenerate. For neither of the Son, Who is simple, and Whom also we believe to be generated,
do we say that His essence is simplicity. But as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so
also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. In like manner also the Son being gener-
ated, our reason is freed from any necessity that, because His essence is simple, we should
define that essence as generateness; but here again each expression has its peculiar force.
For the term generated suggests to you a source whence, and the term simple implies freedom
from composition. But this does not approve itself to them. For they maintain that since
the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy; on
which account also He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to whom we may also observe
that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He Who is so called is
simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of
the Father to be creation and making, since the argument about simplicity introduces into
His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate un-
generacy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its
proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence
by the term ungeneracy, by a parity of reasoning let them likewise see creation and making
in the essence of the Father, not as though the power residing in the essence created and
made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as
bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other propos-
ition as well. For as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, no more is ungeneracy
the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clearness and conciseness I will restate
my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not by reason of His having never been
generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, by a parity of reasoning the
Son also must be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if
we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is manifest
that we must address the Father as ungenerate, because He was not generated. But if we are
compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term
ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions, distin-
guishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point
also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the es-
482
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.